A chip-export restriction can show up as less trade to the restricted destination, or as trade rerouted through a third country such as Singapore, the UAE, or Malaysia; comparing corridor by corridor separates the two. Attribution to any single action stays limited: actions often share a comparison window, and the semiconductor cycle moves the totals on its own.
Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023
Classification 1 reduced 0 redirected 0 expanded 1 absorbing 4 ambiguous 0 not measurable
Advanced Computing Update — TPP Metric · · 2021–22 avg → 2024
Classification 1 reduced 1 redirected 0 expanded 0 absorbing 1 ambiguous 0 not measurable
Corridors drawn across the 2 US actions with a featured corridor set, of the 7 inside the 2012–2024 bilateral comparison window; the register holds 24 US actions in all.
Classified redirected: the corridor fell while the reporter’s total held. The rest: 2 reduced, 0 expanded, 1 absorbing, 5 ambiguous, 0 not measurable
Integrated-circuit records these corridors are drawn from: the rows under HS 8542, out of the 451,069 the bilateral customs table holds across all its HS classes.
Of the 7 US actions inside the 2012–2024 bilateral comparison window, 5 have no featured corridor set. A further 17 US actions fall outside that window: a corridor verdict needs a full post-event calendar year, and the customs rows past 2024 are partial. Those 17 are on the regimes view and stay selectable in the action selector below.
Huawei Entity List Designation (); Huawei Foreign Direct Product Rule (); SMIC Entity List Designation (); CHIPS and Science Act (); December 2024 Expansion ().
Annualized change in bilateral integrated-circuit trade across each featured corridor, post-window minus pre-window. Each panel names its own two windows, and all panels share one linear dollar scale with zero at the vertical rule.
Fill encodes the verdict: reduced solid, redirected amber, expanded forest green, absorbing half-tone (a partner picking up trade another corridor shed), ambiguous hatched, not measurable outline only. A parenthetical in a corridor name says which goods the action restricted. The series is HS 8542; semiconductor manufacturing equipment (HS 8486) trades outside it.
The drawn changes run from $18.7B down to $0.20B, a 95-fold range computed before rounding, so bars at the small end fall below a pixel and their printed values are the reading.
The two basket plates, the corridor ledger and the market chart below show the selected action. The corridor plate above compares every action with a featured corridor set.
China IC import basket · Advanced Computing Export Controls ·
Korea IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023
For each country, the share of license applications BIS denied or returned without action over CY2017–CY2022, its friction rate. Raw approval rates run above 99% almost everywhere, because BIS reports returned-without-action as a stream separate from denial. Each row opens that country's ten most-used export-control classifications. 2,587 rows across 33 jurisdictions.
Denial + RWA share ≥15%. At that rate the license application is itself a gate on what ships, so the regime binds whether or not the buyer is designated.
EAR99Items subject to the EAR that are not elsewhere specified in this CCL762(52.9%)2B350Chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment, except valves control420(20.8%)3E002“Technology” according to the General Technology Note other than that379(78.0%)3E001“Technology” according to the General Technology Note for the “develop362(64.0%)5E001“Technology” as follows (see List of Items Controlled).344(77.3%)2B352Equipment Capable of Use in Handling Biological Materials, as Follows230(41.6%)3A233Mass spectrometers, capable of measuring ions of 230 atomic mass units216(53.9%)3B991Equipment not controlled by 3B001 for the manufacture of electronic “p185(97.4%)3A001Electronic items as follows (see List of Items Controlled).167(13.0%)2B230All types of “pressure transducers” capable of measuring absolute pres147(42.0%)EAR99Items subject to the EAR that are not elsewhere specified in this CCL155(60.8%)3B991Equipment not controlled by 3B001 for the manufacture of electronic “p46(100.0%)5A992Equipment not controlled by 5A002 (see List of Items Controlled).32(68.1%)3A999Specific Processing Equipment, n.e.s., as Follows (See List of Items C20(76.9%)9E991“Technology”, for the “development”, “production” or “use” of equipmen19(51.4%)2B999Specific Processing Equipment, n.e.s., as Follows (See List of Items C18(54.5%)5A991Telecommunication equipment, not controlled by 5A001 (see List of Item15(68.2%)3B001Equipment for the manufacturing of semiconductor devices or materials,14(93.3%)5D992“Information Security” “software” not controlled by 5D002 as follows (13(46.4%)Source. BIS Office of Technology Evaluation, “Annual Country Licensing and Trade Analysis” (per-country PDFs) under Section 1765 of ECRA / 50 USC §4824; the per-country aggregates check against the source PDFs at 88/88. Each classification list is the top ten per category per country, so the classifications shown sum to less than the country total. CY2017-CY2022 coverage; CY2023+ pending OTE publication. Authority tier 1 (primary government measurement).
The United States’ direct share of China’s IC import basket, pre-window against post-window ($14.4B/yr → $7.8B), from a share that was already small before the restriction.
The whole basket’s change across the same window ($377B/yr → $337B), and the denominator every corridor verdict above is judged against.
China IC import basket · Advanced Computing Update — TPP Metric ·
The United States’ direct share of China’s IC import basket, pre-window against post-window ($13.3B/yr → $11.0B), from a share that was already small before the restriction.
The whole basket’s change across the same window ($408B/yr → $373B), and the denominator every corridor verdict above is judged against.
The restricted buyer’s IC import basket (HS 8542) by partner, pre-window against post-window, area-true on one dollar scale shared by every column; ribbons show each partner’s share across the window, and the amber strand is the United States.
Partner blocks keep the labels the customs authorities publish: UN Comtrade files China’s imports from Taiwan under the partner label “Other Asia, nes” (Taiwan's own customs report $47.2B of IC exports to China in 2023, the mirror of that block), and China’s series reports China itself as a partner, its own customs re-imports.
A block shorter than 4.4% of the column carries no printed tag.
This basket $228.9B/yr → $214.2B, −$14.8B; the bars sum to it restricted destination −$18.7B 6.7% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
Japan IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023
This basket $83.4B/yr → $85.5B, +$2.12B; the bars sum to it restricted destination −$0.44B 12.4% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
Germany IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023
This basket $28.1B/yr → $41.5B, +$13.4B; the bars sum to it restricted destination −$0.23B 47.1% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
Netherlands IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023
This basket $18.9B/yr → $12.0B, −$6.94B; the bars sum to it restricted destination +$0.50B 31.5% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
Taiwan IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023
This basket $138.8B/yr → $166.5B, +$27.7B; the bars sum to it restricted destination +$1.77B 4.0% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
Change in the 5 drawn sellers’ exports to the destination their featured corridor restricts, summed across the baskets above
The largest single arrival across the baskets above is unnamed: Germany exports to every destination outside its named nine, rolled into one tail.
Growth landing in the unnamed tails: destinations outside each basket’s named nine.
Japan IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Update — TPP Metric · · 2021–22 avg → 2024
This basket $90.8B/yr → $89.0B, −$1.77B; the bars sum to it restricted destination −$2.94B 12.3% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
Netherlands IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Update — TPP Metric · · 2021–22 avg → 2024
Change in the 2 drawn sellers’ exports to the destination their featured corridor restricts, summed across the baskets above
The largest single named arrival across the baskets above: Japan exports to Hong Kong.
Growth landing in the unnamed tails: destinations outside each basket’s named nine.
For each reporter whose featured corridor the action restricts, the change in its annualized IC exports to every destination in its basket, post-window minus pre-window, on one linear dollar scale shared by every basket of every action. That scale is this plate’s own, so heights here and in the import basket above are not comparable.
Amber is the destination the action restricts, and the faint bar is the unnamed tail; within a basket the bars sum exactly to the printed total change. The drawn changes run from $18.7B down to $1M, a 24,470-fold range computed before rounding, so the smallest fall below a pixel and their printed values are the reading.
Each basket names its nine largest destinations by pre-window value and rolls the rest into one tail, so a destination that was small before the action and large after it arrives only as that tail growing, with no name on it. Each basket prints the share of its pre-window sitting in that tail.
CY2023+ has not been released by BIS. The BIS licensing data behind the friction figures on this page ends at CY2022. Bilateral trade flows (UN Comtrade, CEPII BACI, Taiwan Customs, China GACC, Japan e-Stat) run through 2026, and they are what this page measures for the years after CY2022. The two answer different questions: trade flows record what crossed a border under a customs code; BIS license actions record what was approved, denied, or returned without action.
CY2017–CY2022
2,587 rows × 33 jurisdictions · BIS OTE Annual Country Licensing & Trade Analysis
bis.gov · OTE ↗No public timetable
CY2023 ≈30 months overdue vs the CY2022→early-2023 (~2-4 mo) historical cadence. No suppression / delay announcement issued.
CRS R48642 (Sep 2025) ↗Past due 2026-08-19
Export Control Transparency Act of August 2025 (H.R. 1316, 119th Cong.) mandates a separate, narrower per-entity license-action report — Entity-List / MEU-List scope only — to Congress no later than one year from enactment. The statutory date has passed and no such report has reached the data behind this page.
H.R. 1316 ↗Comtrade · BACI · Customs
UN Comtrade + CEPII BACI (231 reporters) + Taiwan Customs + China GACC + Japan e-Stat. HS 8542 advanced-chip-class proxies through 2026. Measures what shipped under customs declarations.
See the per-question crosswalk for the post-CY2022 window. These panels move when BIS publishes the next release.
This basket $16.2B/yr → $8.56B, −$7.61B; the bars sum to it restricted destination −$0.20B 35.7% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail