Checked 2026-09-03 · unchanged since 2026-08-21RSS
Export Controls
Restrictions matched to the compute they reach and to the trade either side of them.
Chip trade by corridor, before and after each export-control action
A restriction on chip exports can reduce trade to the restricted destination or reroute it through third countries such as Singapore, the UAE, and Malaysia. This view reads 447,429 bilateral integrated-circuit trade records, of 451,069 in the customs corpus (HS 8542, 2010–2026, from UN Comtrade, CEPII BACI, Taiwan Customs, China GACC, and Japan e-Stat) against regional market billings, decomposed by corridor pre/post each BIS action via an interrupted time series with a seasonal YoY counterfactual. Reduced trade means the restriction met its stated goal; redirected trade means it needs multilateral coordination. How attribution is derived↗
China IC import basket · Advanced Computing Export Controls ·
Korea IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023
China · restricted destination−$18.7B
Hong Kong−$9.42B
Philippines−$2.19B
Japan+$0.49B
Vietnam+$0.68B
Malaysia+$0.80B
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BIS license-action overlay
Per-country friction-rate over CY2017-CY2022: denial + RWA share of total applications, the measure the public data supports (raw approval rates run >99% for nearly every jurisdiction because BIS publishes returned-without-action as a stream distinct from denial). Click a row for the country's top-10 ECCN drill-down. 2,587 rows across 33 jurisdictions.
Order
CountryApprovedFrictionYears
Drill-down
Select a country on the left to surface its top-10 approved + denied ECCNs over CY2017-CY2022.
Source. BIS Office of Technology Evaluation, “Annual Country Licensing and Trade Analysis” (per-country PDFs) under Section 1765 of ECRA / 50 USC §4824. Per-country aggregates verified against the source PDFs at 88/88 = 100% pass-rate. Per-ECCN data is top-10 per category per country only; the remaining ECCNs aggregate into the country totals but do not surface at per-ECCN granularity. CY2017-CY2022 coverage; CY2023+ pending OTE publication. Authority tier 1 (primary government measurement).
Taiwan → China · exports+$1.77B (+3.9%)
$5B$0
Classification1 reduced0 redirected0 expanded1 absorbing4 ambiguous0 not measurable
Confound noteMarket cycle confounds: 2020 COVID crash depresses pre-event baseline; 2021 semiconductor supercycle inflates pre-event baseline; post-event year is 2023 (inventory correction). Bilateral changes reflect both policy and macro effects. Other US actions share this comparison window: CHIPS and Science Act.
Japan → China (equipment restricted) · exports−$2.94B (−12.3%)
Netherlands → China (ASML restricted) · exports−$0.20B (−26.0%)
Classification1 reduced1 redirected0 expanded0 absorbing1 ambiguous0 not measurable
Confound noteMarket cycle confounds: 2021 semiconductor supercycle inflates pre-event baseline. Bilateral changes reflect both policy and macro effects.
Scope noteParenthetical qualifiers in a corridor name identify the instrument the action restricted. The series drawn is integrated-circuit trade under HS 8542, which does not include semiconductor manufacturing equipment (HS 8486).
9
Corridors drawn, across the 2 of 7 US actions that have a featured corridor set. The register holds 24 US actions; 7 fall inside the bilateral comparison window (2012–2024)
1
Classified redirected: the corridor fell while the reporter’s total held. The rest: 2 reduced, 0 expanded, 1 absorbing, 5 ambiguous, 0 not measurable
447,429
Integrated-circuit records these corridors are drawn from: the rows matching the corridor predicate (HS 8542), of 451,069 in the bilateral customs corpus. Integrated-circuit subheadings 8542.11/.19/.31/.32/.33/.39/.90; HS 8486 (semiconductor manufacturing equipment) is outside this series.
Actions without featured corridors
The 7 US actions inside the 2012–2024 bilateral comparison window are analysed against the same 447,429-record integrated-circuit substrate; these 5 have no featured corridor set. A further 17 US actions in the register fall outside that window: a corridor verdict needs a full post-event calendar year, and the bilateral series end at 2024. They are listed on the regimes view and remain selectable in the action selector below.
Huawei Entity List Designation
Huawei Foreign Direct Product Rule
SMIC Entity List Designation
CHIPS and Science Act
December 2024 Expansion
Plate VI. Annualized bilateral semiconductor trade (HS 8542) change across each featured corridor, pre- versus post-action. Bar length is proportional to the dollar change on one linear scale shared by both fields; the vertical rule is zero. Each field’s eyebrow names the two windows its bars difference. Ink encodes the corridor classification: reduced solid ink, redirected amber, expanded forest, absorbing half-tone ink, ambiguous hatched, not measurable outline only. The drawn changes span a 95-fold range between the largest and smallest ($18.7B and $0.20B), so the smallest bars are sub-visible and are carried by their printed values.
$377B/yr · 2020–21 avg
$337B · 2023
Other Asia, nes · Comtrade’s Taiwan label $137B$133B Other Asia, nes
Korea $75.0B$62.0B Korea
China · self-reported (re-imports) $46.9B$44.2B China
Malaysia $31.2B$21.9B Malaysia
$21.4B All other partners
United States $14.4B/yr → $7.8B · 3.8% → 2.3% of the basket
China IC import basket · Advanced Computing Update — TPP Metric ·
$408B/yr · 2021–22 avg$373B · 2024Other Asia, nes · Comtrade’s Taiwan label $154B$138B Other Asia, nesKorea $82.2B$80.3B KoreaChina · self-reported (re-imports) $51.7B$54.1B ChinaMalaysia $30.6B$21.8B MalaysiaAll other partners $23.2B$23.7B All other partnersUnited States $13.3B/yr → $11.0B · 3.3% → 2.9% of the basket
3.8% → 2.3%
The direct US strand of China’s IC import basket, pre- versus post-window ($14.4B/yr → $7.8B). The strand was structurally small before it was restricted
−10.5%
The whole basket’s change across the same window ($377B/yr → $337B). This is the denominator every corridor classification above is judged against
Plate VIII. The restricted buyer’s IC import basket (HS 8542) by partner, pre-window against post-window, area-true on one dollar scale shared by every column; ribbons show each partner’s share across the window. Partner blocks keep the substrate’s published identities: UN Comtrade reports China’s imports from Taiwan under the partner label “Other Asia, nes” (cross-check in this payload: Taiwan's own customs report $47.2B of IC exports to China in 2023, the mirror of that block); China’s series reports China itself as a partner (customs re-imports), drawn as published. Blocks under a legibility floor (4.4% of field height) show their values in hover titles and the export rather than printed tags. Hovering a partner isolates its strand.
Other Asia, nes+$0.99B
Other Asia, nes+$2.87B
All other partners · unnamed tail+$4.28B
Singapore+$5.48B
$5B$0
This field$228.9B/yr → $214.2B, −$14.8B; the bars sum to itrestricted destination −$18.7B6.7% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
Japan IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Update — TPP Metric · · 2021–22 avg → 2024
China · restricted destination−$2.94B
Other Asia, nes−$1.44B
All other partners · unnamed tail−$0.97B
Vietnam−$0.91B
Other Asia, nes−$0.86B
Taiwan−$0.72B
Malaysia−$0.65B
Singapore+$1.28B
Korea+$2.25B
Hong Kong+$3.20B
This field$90.8B/yr → $89.0B, −$1.77B; the bars sum to itrestricted destination −$2.94B12.3% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
Japan IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023
Other Asia, nes−$2.05B
Other Asia, nes−$1.50B
Taiwan−$1.05B
China · restricted destination−$0.44B
Malaysia+$0.11B
Hong Kong+$0.30B
Singapore+$0.76B
All other partners · unnamed tail+$1.16B
Vietnam+$1.75B
Korea+$3.09B
This field$83.4B/yr → $85.5B, +$2.12B; the bars sum to itrestricted destination −$0.44B12.4% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
Germany IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023
Malaysia−$0.39B
China · restricted destination−$0.23B
Singapore+$45M
Korea+$0.32B
Other Asia, nes+$1.03B
Other Asia, nes+$1.05B
Romania+$1.15B
Hungary+$1.30B
Netherlands+$3.11B
All other partners · unnamed tail+$5.96B
This field$28.1B/yr → $41.5B, +$13.4B; the bars sum to itrestricted destination −$0.23B47.1% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
Netherlands IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Update — TPP Metric · · 2021–22 avg → 2024
All other partners · unnamed tail−$1.93B
Poland−$1.46B
Germany−$1.33B
Czech Republic−$0.90B
United Kingdom−$0.79B
France−$0.31B
Hungary−$0.27B
Italy−$0.26B
China · restricted destination−$0.20B
United States−$0.16B
This field$16.2B/yr → $8.56B, −$7.61B; the bars sum to itrestricted destination −$0.20B35.7% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
Netherlands IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023
Poland−$2.40B
Czech Republic−$1.83B
All other partners · unnamed tail−$1.21B
United Kingdom−$1.13B
Ireland−$0.59B
Germany−$0.21B
Hungary−$0.20B
Italy−$1M
United States+$0.13B
China · restricted destination+$0.50B
This field$18.9B/yr → $12.0B, −$6.94B; the bars sum to itrestricted destination +$0.50B31.5% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
Taiwan IC exports by destination · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023
Philippines−$0.21B
Thailand+$0.87B
Korea+$1.25B
United States+$1.67B
China · restricted destination+$1.77B
Malaysia+$3.16B
Hong Kong+$4.28B
Singapore+$4.48B
Japan+$5.04B
All other partners · unnamed tail+$5.36B
This field$138.8B/yr → $166.5B, +$27.7B; the bars sum to itrestricted destination +$1.77B4.0% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail
−$20.3B
Change in the 7 drawn sellers’ exports to the destination their featured corridor restricts, summed across the fields above
+$5.96B
The largest single named arrival across every field: Germany exports to All other partners, which is an unnamed rollup rather than one destination
$16.8B
Growth landing in the unnamed tails: destinations outside each basket’s named nine, which this drawing can show arriving but cannot name
Plate IX. The sellers’ side of the same question: for each reporter whose featured corridor the action restricts, the change in its annualized IC exports to every destination in its basket, post-window minus pre-window. Bar length is proportional to the dollar change on one linear scale shared by all 7 fields. That scale is this plate’s own; heights here and on Plate VIII are not comparable. The vertical rule is zero, amber is the destination the action restricts, and the faint bar is the unnamed tail. Within a field the bars sum exactly to the printed total change. The drawn changes span a 24,470-fold range between the largest and smallest ($18.7B and $1M), so the smallest bars are sub-visible and are carried by their printed values. What this plate cannot tell you: each basket names its nine largest destinations by pre-window value and rolls the rest into one tail, so a destination that was small before the action and large after it appears only as that tail growing: visible as an arrival, without a name. Each field prints the share of its pre-window sitting in that tail.
Data-vintage gap · BIS license actions
BIS license-action coverage: CY2017 - CY2022. CY2023+ not yet released by BIS.
The BIS license-action substrate that underpins the export-control-friction half of this page ends at CY2022. Bilateral trade-flow (Comtrade + BACI + Taiwan Customs + China GACC + Japan e-Stat) runs through 2026 and IS what we measure for the post-CY2022 window. The two are not interchangeable: trade-flow records what shipped under HS-coded customs declarations; BIS license-action records what was licensed (or denied, or returned-without-action). They are reported side-by-side and never silently composed.
Substrate vintage
CY2017 - CY2022
2,587 rows × 33 jurisdictions · BIS OTE Annual Country Licensing & Trade Analysis
Export Control Transparency Act of August 2025 (H.R. 1316, 119th Cong.) mandates a separate, narrower per-entity license-action report — Entity-List / MEU-List scope only — to Congress no later than one year from enactment. The statutory date has passed and no such report is in this platform’s substrate; whether one has been delivered to Congress is not something Scrutica measures.
UN Comtrade + CEPII BACI (231 reporters) + Taiwan Customs + China GACC + Japan e-Stat. HS 8542 advanced-chip-class proxies through 2026. Measures what shipped under customs declarations — NOT what BIS licensed.
See what we can / cannot answer about the post-CY2022 window for the per-question crosswalk. Substrate refresh will land on the BIS publication, not on inference; the platform’s “Verify, never hedge” data-quality principle holds — analyst commentary is not a substitute for the government measurement.
