Scrutica
When the US restricts chip exports to constrain Chinese AI compute access, does trade actually fall, or does it reroute through Singapore, the UAE, and Malaysia? This reads 397,705 bilateral semiconductor trade records (HS 8542, 2010–2026, from UN Comtrade, CEPII BACI, Taiwan Customs, China GACC, and Japan e-Stat) against regional market billings, decomposed by corridor pre/post each BIS action via an interrupted time series with a seasonal YoY counterfactual. Reduced trade means the restriction met its stated goal; redirected trade means it needs multilateral coordination — the corridor split is the binary test.
The BIS license-action substrate that underpins the export-control-friction half of this page ends at CY2022. Bilateral trade-flow (Comtrade + BACI + Taiwan Customs + China GACC + Japan e-Stat) runs through 2026 and IS what we measure for the post-CY2022 window. The two are not interchangeable: trade-flow records what shipped under HS-coded customs declarations; BIS license-action records what was licensed (or denied, or returned-without-action). They are reported side-by-side and never silently composed.
Per-country friction-rate over CY2017-CY2022: denial + RWA share of total applications, the honest signal at the public-data layer (raw approval rates run >99% for nearly every jurisdiction because BIS publishes returned-without-action as a stream distinct from denial). Click a row for the country's top-10 ECCN drill-down.2,587 rows across 33 jurisdictions.
See what we can / cannot answer about the post-2022 window for the per-question crosswalk. Substrate refresh will land on the BIS publication, not on inference; the platform’s “Verify, never hedge” data-quality principle holds — analyst commentary is not a substitute for the government measurement.