Compute verification
Accelerator Security Features
Device attestation is documented for 12 of the 35 accelerators in Scrutica’s chip catalogue, including 9 of the 17 restricted for China.
In attestation, a chip signs a report of its firmware for a remote verifier. Below are the register of attestation and ten other features, what has shipped, when each feature arrived, the attestation path, and what vendors and lawmakers have said about kill switches, backdoors, tracking and location.
- Documented on the device
- Partial, or host or cloud only
- Attribution to the chip unverified
- Not documented
Restricted for China (17): 9 documented on the device; 3 partial, or host or cloud only; 1 with attribution to the chip unverified; 4 not documented.
Other catalogued (18): 3 documented on the device; 1 partial, or host or cloud only; 5 with attribution to the chip unverified; 9 not documented.
“Restricted for China” is the export status in Scrutica’s chip catalogue. Its 3 chips under case-by-case review (H200 SXM, H20 SXM and MI325X) are not among the 17.
Security features by accelerator
A hardware root of trust and secure boot are documented on the device for 19 of the 35 catalogued accelerators; TEE-I/O, a vendor location feature and remote disable, for none.
- Documented on the device
- Partial, or host or cloud only
- Attribution to the chip unverified
- Vendor states absent
- Not documented
A documented feature is a capability: these sources do not show whether it is enabled in deployment. Select any square to read what the vendor’s documents say about it.Select any accelerator for its eleven features, and any feature for what the vendor’s documents say about it.
China export status, as the chip catalogue names and defines it
- Restricted
- Case-by-Case Review
- Licence required, reviewed case by case, with conditions attached.
- Designed Compliant
- Designed to meet export-control thresholds.
- Domestic (China)
- Unassessed
- No China export classification is recorded for these chips.
| Root and boot | Identity and attestation | Protection in use | Location and remote disable | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Accelerator | China export status | |||||||||||
| Documented on the device, of the 35 | 19 | 19 | 4 | 9 | 12 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | |
| NVIDIA | ||||||||||||
| A100 SXM | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented | Identity key: documented, unverified | Device attestation: partial | Confidential computing: partial | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: partial, unverified | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| A800 | Restricted | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| H100 SXM5 | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: documented | Multi-device protection: partial | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: partial | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| H100 PCIe | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: documented | Multi-device protection: vendor states absent | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: partial | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| H100 NVL | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: documented | Multi-device protection: vendor states absent | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: partial | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| H800 SXM5 | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: documented | Multi-device protection: partial | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: partial | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| H800 PCIe | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: documented | Multi-device protection: vendor states absent | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: partial | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| H200 SXM | Case-by-Case Review | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: documented | Multi-device protection: partial | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: partial | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| H20 SXM | Case-by-Case Review | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: documented | Multi-device protection: partial | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: partial | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| H20E (HBM3E refresh) | Unassessed | Root of trust: documented, unverified | Secure boot: documented, unverified | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented, unverified | Device attestation: documented, unverified | Confidential computing: documented, unverified | Multi-device protection: partial, unverified | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent, unverified | Link encryption: partial, unverified | Location feature: partial, unverified | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent, unverified |
| B100 | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: partial | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: partial | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| B200 | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: documented | Multi-device protection: documented | TEE-I/O: partial | Link encryption: documented | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| B300 | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: documented | Multi-device protection: documented | TEE-I/O: partial | Link encryption: documented | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| B30A | Designed Compliant | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| Rubin GPU | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: partial | Confidential computing: partial | Multi-device protection: partial | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: partial | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| AMD | ||||||||||||
| MI300X | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented | Identity key: partial, unverified | Device attestation: partial | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| MI325X | Case-by-Case Review | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| MI350X | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: partial | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: partial | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| MI355X | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: partial | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: partial | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| MI400 | Restricted | Root of trust: documented, unverified | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: documented, unverified | Device attestation: documented, unverified | Confidential computing: host or cloud only, unverified | Multi-device protection: host or cloud only, unverified | TEE-I/O: documented, unverified | Link encryption: documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Huawei | ||||||||||||
| Ascend 910B | Domestic (China) | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: documented, unverified | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: partial, unverified | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Ascend 910C | Domestic (China) | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: partial, unverified | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: partial, unverified | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Ascend 910D | Domestic (China) | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Ascend 920 | Domestic (China) | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Intel | ||||||||||||
| Gaudi 2 | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Gaudi 3 | Restricted | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| TPU v4 | Unassessed | Root of trust: host or cloud only, unverified | Secure boot: host or cloud only, unverified | Rollback protection: host or cloud only, unverified | Identity key: host or cloud only, unverified | Device attestation: host or cloud only, unverified | Confidential computing: vendor states absent from its cloud service | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| TPU v5e | Unassessed | Root of trust: host or cloud only, unverified | Secure boot: host or cloud only, unverified | Rollback protection: host or cloud only, unverified | Identity key: host or cloud only, unverified | Device attestation: host or cloud only, unverified | Confidential computing: vendor states absent from its cloud service | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| TPU v5p | Unassessed | Root of trust: host or cloud only, unverified | Secure boot: host or cloud only, unverified | Rollback protection: host or cloud only, unverified | Identity key: host or cloud only, unverified | Device attestation: host or cloud only, unverified | Confidential computing: vendor states absent from its cloud service | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| TPU v6e (Trillium) | Unassessed | Root of trust: host or cloud only, unverified | Secure boot: host or cloud only, unverified | Rollback protection: host or cloud only, unverified | Identity key: host or cloud only, unverified | Device attestation: host or cloud only, unverified | Confidential computing: vendor states absent from its cloud service | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| TPU v7 (Ironwood) | Unassessed | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: host or cloud only, unverified | Identity key: partial, unverified | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: vendor states absent from its cloud service | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Amazon | ||||||||||||
| Trainium3 | Unassessed | Root of trust: host or cloud only | Secure boot: host or cloud only | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: host or cloud only | Confidential computing: host or cloud only | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: host or cloud only | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Cerebras | ||||||||||||
| WSE-3 | Unassessed | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Tenstorrent | ||||||||||||
| Wormhole n300 | Unassessed | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Blackhole p150 | Unassessed | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: partial | Rollback protection: partial | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
27 accelerators outside Scrutica’s chip catalogue
| Root and boot | Identity and attestation | Protection in use | Location and remote disable | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Accelerator | China export status | |||||||||||
| NVIDIA | ||||||||||||
| A100 80GB PCIe | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented | Identity key: documented, unverified | Device attestation: partial | Confidential computing: partial | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: partial, unverified | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| H800 NVL | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: documented | Multi-device protection: vendor states absent | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: partial | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| H200 NVL | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: documented | Multi-device protection: vendor states absent | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: partial | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| GH200 superchip | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| L40S | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: vendor states absent | Multi-device protection: vendor states absent | TEE-I/O: vendor states absent | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| GB200 superchip | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| GB300 superchip | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| RTX PRO 6000 Server | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: documented, unverified | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: documented | Confidential computing: documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: partial | Link encryption: documented | Location feature: partial | Position on remote disable: vendor states absent |
| AMD | ||||||||||||
| MI250X | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| MI300A | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| MI308X | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Huawei | ||||||||||||
| Ascend 910A | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: documented | Secure boot: documented | Rollback protection: partial | Identity key: documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| TPU 8t | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: vendor states absent from its cloud service | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| TPU 8i | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: vendor states absent from its cloud service | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Amazon | ||||||||||||
| Trainium | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: host or cloud only | Secure boot: host or cloud only | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: host or cloud only | Confidential computing: host or cloud only | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: host or cloud only | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Inferentia2 | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: host or cloud only | Secure boot: host or cloud only | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: host or cloud only | Confidential computing: host or cloud only | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Trainium2 | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: host or cloud only | Secure boot: host or cloud only | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: host or cloud only | Confidential computing: host or cloud only | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: host or cloud only | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Cerebras | ||||||||||||
| WSE-3 Turbo | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Microsoft | ||||||||||||
| Maia 100 | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: host or cloud only, unverified | Secure boot: host or cloud only, unverified | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Maia 200 | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: documented, unverified | Secure boot: host or cloud only, unverified | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: documented, unverified | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Meta | ||||||||||||
| MTIA v1 | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: partial | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| MTIA v2 | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: partial | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| MTIA 300 | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: partial | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| MTIA 400 | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| MTIA 450 | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| MTIA 500 | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: not documented | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
| Moore Threads | ||||||||||||
| MTT S4000 | Not in the catalogue | Root of trust: not documented | Secure boot: not documented | Rollback protection: not documented | Identity key: not documented | Device attestation: not documented | Confidential computing: partial | Multi-device protection: not documented | TEE-I/O: not documented | Link encryption: not documented | Location feature: not documented | Position on remote disable: not documented |
How to read the register
The 11 features run in stack order, from the root of trust to the position on remote disable.
The register’s 35 accelerators are the chips in Scrutica’s chip catalogue, with their export status for China from it; the 27 researched outside the catalogue have no export status and are listed apart.
Vendors follow the catalogue’s order, with those that have no chip in it last; each heading gives how the vendor’s parts are offered and how many of its documents were read.
A feature documented only for the host server or the cloud service counts as partial. A cell is dotted, and not counted as documented, where its attribution or its application to the chip is unverified, or where only press or analyst sources describe the feature. A feature documented for an architecture counts on that architecture’s chips.
The location and remote-disable columns record what vendors state. Where a vendor states that a feature is absent, public documents cannot confirm it.
On Hopper, NVIDIA documents attestation only in confidential-computing mode.
Device attestation, across the 35 catalogued accelerators
- 12 documented on the device: 9 of the 17 restricted for China, 3 of the 18 others
- 4 partial, or host or cloud only
- 6 with attribution to the chip unverified
- 13 not documented
Select any square to read what the vendor’s documents say about it.
Shipped compute by what is documented
Weighted by Epoch AI’s median shipment estimates through 2025, 27% of the 20.4 million H100-equivalents shipped is in chip types documented with attestation on the device; another 43% is in chip types whose Epoch estimate covers chips documented differently.
- Documented on the device
- Attribution to the chip unverified
- Partial, or host or cloud only
- One estimate covering chips documented differently
- Vendor states absent
- Vendor states absent from its cloud service
- Not documented
Share documented on the device
| Chip type | Documentation | H100-equivalents (thousands) |
|---|---|---|
| NVIDIA B200 | One estimate covering chips documented differently | 4,847 |
| NVIDIA H100 | Documented on the device | 4,317 |
| NVIDIA B300 | One estimate covering chips documented differently | 3,792 |
| Google TPU v6e | Attribution to the chip unverified | 2,291 |
| Amazon Trainium2 | Partial, or host or cloud only | 919 |
19 more chip types
| Chip type | Documentation | H100-equivalents (thousands) |
|---|---|---|
| AMD Instinct MI300X | Partial, or host or cloud only | 695 |
| Google TPU v7 | Documented on the device | 687 |
| Huawei Ascend 910C | Not documented | 499 |
| Google TPU v5e | Attribution to the chip unverified | 475 |
| Google TPU v5p | Attribution to the chip unverified | 312 |
| NVIDIA A100 | Partial, or host or cloud only | 303 |
| NVIDIA H20 | One estimate covering chips documented differently | 223 |
| Huawei Ascend 910B | Not documented | 209 |
| AMD Instinct MI350X | Documented on the device | 192 |
| AMD Instinct MI355X | Documented on the device | 124 |
| NVIDIA H800 | Documented on the device | 115 |
| AMD Instinct MI300A | Not documented | 114 |
| AMD Instinct MI325X | Not documented | 104 |
| Amazon Trainium1 | Partial, or host or cloud only | 94 |
| NVIDIA A800 | Not documented | 38 |
| Google TPU v4 | Attribution to the chip unverified | 36 |
| AMD Instinct MI308X | Not documented | 10 |
| AMD Instinct MI250X | Not documented | 9 |
| Google TPU v4i | Not in the register | 2 |
The accelerators each chip type counts (24)
- NVIDIA B200 counts two rows that read differently: B200, documented on the device; GB200 superchip, not documented. Epoch links this series to its GB200 hardware entry; NVIDIA documents HGX B200 boards and does not name GB200 systems, so both rows count.
- NVIDIA H100 counts H100 SXM5, H100 PCIe and H100 NVL.
- NVIDIA B300 counts two rows that read differently: B300, documented on the device; GB300 superchip, not documented. Epoch links this series to its GB300 hardware entry; NVIDIA documents HGX B300 boards and does not name GB300 systems, so both rows count.
- Google TPU v6e counts TPU v6e (Trillium).
- Amazon Trainium2 counts Trainium2.
- AMD Instinct MI300X counts MI300X.
- Google TPU v7 counts TPU v7 (Ironwood).
- Huawei Ascend 910C counts Ascend 910C.
- Google TPU v5e counts TPU v5e.
- Google TPU v5p counts TPU v5p.
- NVIDIA A100 counts A100 SXM and A100 80GB PCIe.
- NVIDIA H20 counts two rows that read differently: H20 SXM, documented on the device; H20E (HBM3E refresh), attribution to the chip unverified.
- Huawei Ascend 910B counts Ascend 910B.
- AMD Instinct MI350X counts MI350X.
- AMD Instinct MI355X counts MI355X.
- NVIDIA H800 counts H800 SXM5, H800 PCIe and H800 NVL.
- AMD Instinct MI300A counts MI300A.
- AMD Instinct MI325X counts MI325X.
- Amazon Trainium1 counts Trainium.
- NVIDIA A800 counts A800.
- Google TPU v4 counts TPU v4.
- AMD Instinct MI308X counts MI308X.
- AMD Instinct MI250X counts MI250X.
- Google TPU v4i has no row in the register.
How shipments are weighted
Epoch AI’s median estimates of compute shipped from each designer’s series start (2022 to 2024) through 31 Dec 2025: 20.4 million H100-equivalents over 24 chip types. Series start by designer: NVIDIA’s from 2022, Google’s from 2023 and AMD’s, Huawei’s and Amazon’s from 2024. The medians are added; Epoch’s 90% intervals (5th to 95th percentile) are left out.
Accelerator models are recorded for 9 facilities (enrichment records of 19 Apr 2026), against 4,266 published in the facility register (snapshot 3 Oct 2026). That coverage is too sparse to weight by installed hardware; shipment estimates supply the weights.
Cambricon Siyuan 590 (38 thousand H100-equivalents) is left out: Epoch’s series for Cambricon restarts each year, and only series with a single starting point enter this total.
Source: Epoch AI, AI Chip Sales (CC BY 4.0, snapshot 19 Apr 2026).
When each capability arrived
Each mark dates the first documentation of a feature for one architecture, 2021 to 2026, beside the US export-control actions on AI chips over the same years.
- Documented
- Partial, or host or cloud only
- Early access to release
- Announced
- Removed
- Export control
- Earlier
- Attribution to the chip unverified
Italic: outside Scrutica’s chip catalogue
Not drawn: Huawei and Moore Threads, which have no dated chip in the register; Cerebras, whose register rows have no feature documented on the device.
Attestation service live for H100
Device attestation
General Availability (GA) release of the NVIDIA Remote Attestation Service (NRAS). Provides GPU attestation support for H100 GPUs. Generates signed EAT (Entity Attestation Token) as the attestation response.
Source (1)
Remote Attestation Service: Releases · primary · 29 Jul 2023 to 5 Aug 2025 (release entries)
29 Jul 2023, NVIDIA Hopper: Attestation service live for H100
How the marks are dated
The first documented security features by architecture and vendor, beside the export-control actions in Scrutica’s chip catalogue. NVIDIA’s marks are its dated releases. For other vendors, each mark is the first chip to document a feature, at the date of the chip’s launch, availability or deployment; the document can be later. A ring marks a chip that had only been announced. Marks of one lane that would touch are set side by side, a little off their dates, or on a phone on a second line in the lane first; the card gives each date as its source does.
All 31 events as a list
Italic: outside Scrutica’s chip catalogue
- NVIDIA AmpereVolta V100 generationBefore the axis: firmware authenticated since Volta V100 Source
- AMD Instinct8 Nov 2021MI250X: root of trust, secure boot Source
- NVIDIA Ampere25 Feb 2022A100 PCIe variants without firmware attestation Source
- NVIDIA Ampere22 Mar 2022Confidential VM preview with A100 (Azure) Source
- Intel Gaudi10 May 2022Gaudi 2: root of trust, secure boot, rollback protection Source
- Export controls21 Oct 2022October 2022 Advanced Computing Rule 87 FR 62186
- Meta MTIA18 May 2023MTIA v1: partial secure boot Source
- NVIDIA Hopper29 Jul 2023Attestation service live for H100 Source
- NVIDIA Hopper3 Aug 2023 – Feb 2024Confidential computing, early access to GA Source
- Microsoft Maia15 Nov 2023Maia 100: link encryption Source
- Export controls17 Nov 2023October 2023 Advanced Computing Update 88 FR 73458
- AMD Instinct6 Dec 2023MI300X: rollback protection, partial identity key (unverified), partial device attestation Source
- NVIDIA HopperJun 2024 – 23 Apr 2025Multi-GPU, NVLink unencrypted Source
- Export controls2 Dec 2024December 2024 Expansion 89 FR 96790
- NVIDIA Blackwell29 Jan 2025Attestation service adds Blackwell Source
- Tenstorrent3 Apr 2025Blackhole p150: partial secure boot, partial rollback protection Source
- Export controls9 Apr 2025Licence required for H20 Source
- NVIDIA BlackwellMay–Aug 2025Confidential computing on B200 Source
- AMD Instinct12 Jun 2025MI350X, MI355X: device attestation, partial link encryption Source
- Export controls14 Jul 2025H20 licence applications Source
- Amazon23 Sep 2025EC2 instance attestation (cloud level) Source
- NVIDIA BlackwellDec 2025Multi-GPU with encrypted NVLink Source
- NVIDIA Blackwell10 Dec 2025 – 11 May 2026Fleet service, operator-declared location Source
- NVIDIA Rubin5 Jan 2026Rack-scale confidential computing announced Source
- Export controls15 Jan 2026January 2026 License Review Policy Revision 91 FR 1684
- Microsoft Maia26 Jan 2026Maia 200: root of trust (unverified) Source
- NVIDIA Blackwell4 Feb 2026Attestation outside confidential-computing mode Source
- Google TPU31 Mar 2026TPU v7 (Ironwood): root of trust, secure boot, partial identity key (unverified), device attestation Source
- NVIDIA Hopper11 May 2026Fleet service, operator-declared location Source
- NVIDIA Rubin11 May 2026Fleet service, operator-declared location Source
- AMD Instinct23 Jul 2026MI400: identity key (unverified), TEE-I/O (unverified), link encryption Source
The attestation path, step by step
Twelve steps take an NVIDIA GPU from its factory identity to a relying party’s decision, and none of them shows where the chip is, what it computed or that its firmware is free of bugs.
0 At the factory: the GPU gets an identity
NVIDIA factory and CA → GPU: Fused identity key, certified by NVIDIA’s CA
A device-unique private key is fused into each GPU and NVIDIA's certificate authority (CA) certifies the public key. All later steps trust this.
Scrutica’s inferenceIEEE 802.1AR is listed as the standard for a device identity its supplier installs (an IDevID); neither NVIDIA white paper cited on this path mentions it.
Sources (3)
1 At power-on: secure boot
GPU, on its own: Root of trust checks NVIDIA’s firmware signature
The GPU's on-die root of trust only runs NVIDIA-signed firmware and locks it until reset.
Scrutica’s inferenceDICE (the Device Identifier Composition Engine of the Trusted Computing Group, TCG) and Caliptra (an open root of trust for data-centre chips, specified by the Open Compute Project) are listed as the standards-based pattern for this step; NVIDIA's documents do not say Hopper/Blackwell use Caliptra or TCG DICE.
Sources (4)
2 The host switches on confidential computing
Host and hypervisor → GPU: Mode switch; the GPU resets and scrubs memory
Switching confidential-computing mode requires a GPU reset; memory is locked and scrubbed before hand-over.
Sources (2)
3 The host launches a confidential virtual machine
Host and hypervisor → Confidential VM: TDX trust domain or SEV-SNP guest
The CVM runs as an Intel TDX (Trust Domain Extensions) trust domain or an AMD SEV-SNP (Secure Encrypted Virtualization with Secure Nested Paging) guest, memory encrypted and isolated from the hypervisor.
Sources (4)
4 The GPU is assigned to the virtual machine
Host and hypervisor → Confidential VM: GPU assigned; bounce buffers, with TDISP and IDE a future option on TEE-I/O platforms
Hopper: data moves through encrypted bounce buffers in shared memory. Blackwell, on TEE-I/O platforms (which extend the trusted execution environment, or TEE, to include the GPU) NVIDIA describes as a future option: TDISP (the TEE Device Interface Security Protocol) locks the device interface into the CVM and IDE (Integrity and Data Encryption) encrypts the PCIe (PCI Express) link.
In the future, as an alternative to the bounce buffer method, inline encryption can be used with systems that have Blackwell B100/B200 GPUs and TDISP/IDE-compatible CPUs.
NVIDIA Secure AI with Blackwell and Hopper GPUs (White Paper WP-12554-001_v1.3), p. 21 (printed); PDF p. 25 · primary · 14 Aug 2025
Later or contrary evidenceOn 22 Sep 2026 NVIDIA wrote that, under B200 confidential computing, host-to-device transfers pass through a software-encrypted bounce buffer. Enabling Private High-Performance Production AI Inference with NVIDIA Confidential Computing · primary
Sources (6)
5 Driver and GPU open an encrypted session
Confidential VM ↔ GPU: Versions, algorithms, certificates, key exchange
Inside the CVM the NVIDIA driver negotiates with GPU firmware (version, capabilities, algorithms and certificates under SPDM, the Security Protocol and Data Model) and runs a Diffie-Hellman key exchange to establish an encrypted channel.
Sources (4)
6 The GPU produces evidence
GPU → Verifier: Measurements signed over the verifier’s nonce
A fresh nonce (a number used once) from the verifier goes to the GPU; the GPU returns SPDM MEASUREMENTS signed with an attestation key that its device identity key has certified.
Sources (4)
7 A verifier appraises the GPU
Verifier, on its own: Chain to NVIDIA’s root, revocation, nonce, reference manifest
NVIDIA’s Remote Attestation Service (NRAS), or the local verifier, checks the certificate chain to NVIDIA's root and its revocation status, the signature and nonce, then compares the measurements with NVIDIA's signed reference integrity manifest (RIM) for that driver and GPU model.
Sources (4)
8 The verifier issues an attestation result
Verifier → Relying party: Signed Entity Attestation Token, directly or by way of the VM
The result is a signed Entity Attestation Token (EAT) in JSON Web Token (JWT) form with claims such as hardware model, UEID (universal entity ID), debug status and measurement result.
Sources (4)
9 The CPU is attested too
Confidential VM → Verifier: TDX quote or SEV-SNP report
The CVM obtains its own attestation from the CPU. With Intel TDX it is a quote from the TD-quoting enclave, which generates a trust domain’s remote attestation, certified through a chain of PCK (Provisioning Certification Key) certificates to Intel’s root. With AMD SEV-SNP it is a report signed by the chip’s VCEK (Versioned Chip Endorsement Key), whose certificate comes from AMD’s key distribution service (KDS) and chains to AMD’s root key (ARK) through its signing key (ASK).
Sources (5)
10 CPU and GPU results are combined
Verifier, on its own: CPU and GPU evidence appraised together
A verifier can appraise CPU and GPU evidence together; a key the CVM generated can be bound into the CPU report so secrets go only to that VM.
Scrutica’s inferenceNo standard found specifies how a deployment binds the GPU's evidence to one particular CVM on the host; the sources examined describe composite appraisal and the binding of keys into report data.
Later or contrary evidenceResearchers publishing as TEE.fail (Oct 2025) reported that, once keys are extracted from the CPU’s trusted execution environment, NVIDIA attestations can be borrowed from other devices, since they are bound to no particular VM. TEE.fail: Breaking Trusted Execution Environments via DDR5 Memory Bus Interposition (project site) · research
Sources (4)
11 The relying party decides
Relying party → Confidential VM: Allows the device to communicate, or blocks it
The Relying Party checks the token's signature against the verifier's published keys, applies its own appraisal policy and, on its decision, “will allow the device to communicate or block it”; CUDA programs (software written for NVIDIA GPUs) run only after attestation succeeds.
Scrutica’s inferenceScrutica interprets the relying party as a key service that releases data or model keys only after this decision; NVIDIA’s white papers describe no key release.
Sources (6)
Not shown by any step: location, workload history, firmware defects
Nothing above measures where the hardware physically is, what it computed before or after, or that the firmware is free of bugs; the EAT location claim is self-reported, and proposals to bind location to attestation (V-PEA) are drafts that admit sensor spoofing.
Sources (5)
Statements on kill switches, backdoors, tracking and location
Twelve statements from May 2025 to March 2026, six of them NVIDIA’s.
“Specifically, the bill directs the Department of Commerce to require any covered integrated circuit product to have chip security mechanisms that implement location verification before the product is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to or in a foreign country.” Full statement
Summary of the Chip Security Act (H.R. 3447) as introduced in the House
Specifically, the bill directs the Department of Commerce to require any covered integrated circuit product to have chip security mechanisms that implement location verification before the product is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to or in a foreign country.
CRS bill summary, H.R. 3447 Chip Security Act (govinfo BILLSUM) · research · 15 May 2025
Each lists the Chip Security Act among the issues it lobbied on; the reports name issues and record no position. Full statement
Lobbying reports (LD-2), second quarter 2025 to second quarter 2026
Each lists the Chip Security Act among the issues it lobbied on; the reports name issues and record no position. Of the 164 lobbying filings for those quarters that name the bill, 35 are for these four companies, counting amendments and reports by firms they hired: NVIDIA 11, AMD 9, Intel 5 and Google 10.
A filing by each company for the second quarters of 2025 and 2026 (8)
- LD-2, NVIDIA Corporation, 2025 Q2 (lda.gov API) · primary · filed 18 Jul 2025
- LD-2, NVIDIA Corporation, 2026 Q2 (lda.gov API) · primary · filed 18 Jul 2026
- LD-2, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 2025 Q2 (lda.gov API) · primary · filed 21 Jul 2025
- LD-2, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 2026 Q2 (lda.gov API) · primary · filed 20 Jul 2026
- LD-2, Intel Corporation, 2025 Q2 (lda.gov API) · primary · filed 18 Jul 2025
- LD-2, Intel Corporation, 2026 Q2 (lda.gov API) · primary · filed 17 Jul 2026
- LD-2, Google Client Services LLC, 2025 Q2 (lda.gov API) · primary · filed 21 Jul 2025
- LD-2, Google Client Services LLC, 2026 Q2 (lda.gov API) · primary · filed 20 Jul 2026
Translation by Scrutica, in EnglishOn 31 July 2025 the Cyberspace Administration of China summoned NVIDIA and required it to explain the vulnerability and backdoor security risks of the H20 computing chips it sells to China, and to submit supporting evidence. Full statement
Notice of the summons on its website
- Original, in Chinese
美人工智能领域专家透露,英伟达算力芯片“追踪定位”“远程关闭”技术已成熟。
Translation by Scrutica, in EnglishExperts in the US artificial-intelligence field have disclosed that the “tracking and positioning” and “remote shutdown” technology for NVIDIA’s computing chips is mature.
- Original, in Chinese
国家互联网信息办公室于2025年7月31日约谈了英伟达公司,要求英伟达公司就对华销售的H20算力芯片漏洞后门安全风险问题进行说明并提交相关证明材料。
Translation by Scrutica, in EnglishOn 31 July 2025 the Cyberspace Administration of China summoned NVIDIA and required it to explain the vulnerability and backdoor security risks of the H20 computing chips it sells to China, and to submit supporting evidence.
国家互联网信息办公室就H20算力芯片漏洞后门安全风险约谈英伟达公司 · primary · 31 Jul 2025
Five NVIDIA statements, July to December 2025. Each says its chips have none of what is marked; the blog post of 5 August adds that they should not have them.
, marked: backdoors. “NVIDIA does not have ‘backdoors’ in our chips that would give anyone a remote way to access or control them,” an Nvidia spokesperson said in a statement to AP. Full statement
Spokesperson statement after the summons
Cybersecurity is critically important to us. NVIDIA does not have ‘backdoors’ in our chips that would give anyone a remote way to access or control them,
an Nvidia spokesperson said in a statement to AP.China summons Nvidia over ‘backdoor safety risks’ in H20 chips (AP, syndicated by WSLS) · press or analyst · 31 Jul 2025 · A statement to the press, with no copy found on an NVIDIA site · also Beijing asks Nvidia about backdoors in China-bound AI chips (The Register), 31 Jul 2025
, marked: backdoors; kill switches or remote disable. “NVIDIA GPUs do not and should not have kill switches and backdoors.” Full statement
NVIDIA blog, by its chief security officer
NVIDIA GPUs do not and should not have kill switches and backdoors.
Some point to smartphone features like ‘find my phone’ or ‘remote wipe’ as models for a GPU kill switch. That comparison doesn’t hold water — optional software features, controlled by the user, are not hardware backdoors.
No Backdoors. No Kill Switches. No Spyware · primary · 5 Aug 2025
, marked: backdoors. Translation by Scrutica, in EnglishNVIDIA chips have no ‘backdoors’ and will not let anyone access or control the chips remotely. Full statement
Reply after an article of 10 August by the account Yuyuan Tantian, relayed in Chinese
- Original, in Chinese
英伟达回应称:“网络安全对我们至关重要。英伟达的芯片不存在‘后门’,不会让任何人通过远程方式访问或控制芯片。”
Translation by Scrutica, in EnglishNVIDIA responded: “Cybersecurity is critically important to us. NVIDIA chips have no ‘backdoors’ and will not let anyone access or control the chips remotely.”
英伟达再回应H20芯片“后门”风险 · press or analyst · 11 Aug 2025 · Relayed by the press; the English original was not located on an NVIDIA host.
, marked: backdoors; kill switches or remote disable; hardware tracking. “NVIDIA GPUs do not have hardware tracking technology, kill switches and backdoors.” Full statement
NVIDIA blog on the fleet management service
This optional service provides real-time monitoring by each GPU system communicating and sharing GPU metrics with the external cloud service. NVIDIA GPUs do not have hardware tracking technology, kill switches and backdoors.
Opt-In NVIDIA Software Enables Data Center Fleet Management · primary · 10 Dec 2025
, marked: kill switches or remote disable. “There is no feature within Nvidia GPUs that allow Nvidia or a remote actor to disable the Nvidia GPU,” Nvidia said. Full statement
There is no feature within Nvidia GPUs that allow Nvidia or a remote actor to disable the Nvidia GPU,
Nvidia said.Nvidia builds location verification tech that could help fight chip smuggling (Reuters, syndicated by Yahoo Finance) · press or analyst · 10 Dec 2025 · Relayed by the press.
- Reuters’ report of what an unnamed NVIDIA official said
The software was built to allow customers to track a chip’s overall computing performance - a common practice among companies that buy fleets of processors for large data centers - and would use the time delay in communicating with servers run by Nvidia to give a sense of the chip’s location on par with what other internet-based services can provide, according to an Nvidia official.
Nvidia builds location verification tech that could help fight chip smuggling (Reuters, syndicated by Yahoo Finance) · press or analyst · 10 Dec 2025 · Relayed by the press from an unnamed NVIDIA official; none of the NVIDIA documents read describes it.
“[the USG] may impose additional conditions such as requiring chip tracking and throttling mechanisms that could disable or impair GPUs if certain events, including unauthorized system configuration, use, or location, are detected. Such government mandates in chip designs could introduce system vulnerabilities and expose us to significant risk and potential liability […]” Full statement
[the USG] may impose additional conditions such as requiring chip tracking and throttling mechanisms that could disable or impair GPUs if certain events, including unauthorized system configuration, use, or location, are detected. Such government mandates in chip designs could introduce system vulnerabilities and expose us to significant risk and potential liability, negatively impact demand for our products, and could have a material impact on our business, operating results, and financial condition.
China’s government publicly questioned whether our H20 products have built-in vulnerabilities, discouraging customers from purchasing our products. We provided a public response explaining that our GPUs, including H20, do not include such built-in vulnerabilities, and will respond to any follow-up questions we receive.
NVIDIA Form 10-K for fiscal year ended 2026-01-25 · primary · 25 Feb 2026 (filed)
“While there are valid commercial reasons for companies to pursue location verification, a government chip tracking mandate would create the impression of deepening U.S. government control over the American AI stack […]” Full statement
ITI blog, on the Chip Security Act
While there are valid commercial reasons for companies to pursue location verification, a government chip tracking mandate would create the impression of deepening U.S. government control over the American AI stack, fueling questions about the security, reliability, and privacy of U.S. technology and pushing the very countries that should be core customers of U.S. providers toward alternatives.
Instead of requiring U.S. companies to track AI chips, policymakers should address export control avoidance by increasing funding and staffing for the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), which administers and enforces U.S. export controls.
The Unintended Consequence of the Chip Security Act (ITI TechWonk blog, Mike Flynn) · primary · 27 Feb 2026
“While we understand policymakers’ interest in addressing this issue, we cannot support blanket mandates for new, untested, and potentially infeasible on-chip mechanisms, such as what is being proposed in the Chip Security Act.” Full statement
Statement by John Neuffer, its president and chief executive, on the Chip Security Act
SIA members are fully committed to complying with export controls, and we strongly oppose the illicit diversion and misuse of our chip technologies. While we understand policymakers’ interest in addressing this issue, we cannot support blanket mandates for new, untested, and potentially infeasible on-chip mechanisms, such as what is being proposed in the Chip Security Act. Rushing to legislate complex, costly, and unproven security features risks undermining global trust in American semiconductor technologies and efforts to promote the export of the American AI technology stack, eroding our global leadership and competitiveness.
Our companies work closely with government agencies, law enforcement, and other relevant stakeholders to prevent and detect illegal diversion and misuse of our products.
SIA Statement on Chip Security Act (Semiconductor Industry Association) · primary · 2 Mar 2026
“The Chip Security Act enhances protections on AI chip exports by scaling up best security practices and encouraging innovative technologies,” said South and Central Asia Subcommittee Chairman Bill Huizenga. Full statement
House Foreign Affairs Committee release on advancing the Chip Security Act, which he introduced
The Chip Security Act enhances protections on AI chip exports by scaling up best security practices and encouraging innovative technologies,
said South and Central Asia Subcommittee Chairman Bill Huizenga.This bill directly supports the Trump administration’s AI Action Plan recommendations and benefits from both the administration’s technical assistance and industry feedback.
Chairman Mast, HFAC, Advances Chip Security Act (House Foreign Affairs Committee) · primary · 26 Mar 2026
Statements on other topics (6)
None of these addresses kill switches, backdoors, tracking or location verification.
- AMD describes its export-compliance screening, in written answers to the Senate Commerce Committee
- Huawei guarantees that its commitment to cyber security “will never be outweighed by the consideration of commercial interests”
- Google recommends research on chip security and more resources for BIS
- Cerebras discloses security conditions on its export licences for the UAE
- Jim Keller, Tenstorrent’s chief executive, says Blackhole will need to be de-featured to ship to China, as EE Times reports
- Microsoft asks that the AI diffusion rule’s quantitative caps go and its qualitative security standards stay
The instruments that ask for verification, among them the Chip Security Act, are quoted and dated in the policy register.