Checked 2026-08-30 · unchanged since 2025-11-10RSS
Export Controls
Restrictions matched to the compute they reach and to the trade either side of them.
29 regulatory actions across three regimes
The regulatory landscape entry by entry since 2019, each cited to its own regime’s instrument where one is published, with scope, standing, and cross-regime interaction.
The docket carries 32 entries in all: the 29 actions above, plus 2 bills that have passed a chamber or a committee and are not law, and 1 analyst publication kept on the timeline as context for the diversion corridor. That last one is not an act of any government. Each entry states its own kind in the register below.
23
Restrictions: designations, thresholds, licence requirements and tariffs that tighten the regime.
4
Relaxations: a rescission, a suspension, an easing of licence review, a country-group move.
4
Framework establishments: statutes, plans and codes that build machinery instead of restricting a good.
1
Analyst publication: on the timeline as context for the diversion corridor. It is not an act of any government, carries no direction, and sits outside the 29 regulatory actions.
4
Faded marks are not operative: 2 superseded by a later action, 2 recorded but not in force. Fill still reads direction; the fade is a separate channel.
21
Pairs of entries in different regimes dated within 90 days of each other; 6 of them fall within 30 and are drawn heavier. They involve 15 of the 32 and fall between September 2024 and November 2025. Each pair is named beneath the caption.
Plate IV. One mark per entry, on its regime’s lane. Solid squares restrict, open squares relax, slate squares establish a framework, and a hairline square is an analyst publication rather than an instrument; faded marks are not operative. Entries too close together to separate on the axis stack vertically inside their lane, and vertical position carries nothing else. A tie joins two entries in different regimes dated within 90 days of each other; it is drawn between the two marks themselves, so its horizontal run is the interval, and a tie within 30 days draws heavier. That heavier weight is a second reading of the same pairs, and the count above does not move with it. The axis plots the date each action takes effect where the record carries one, and otherwise the date its source records. The coordination question is when regimes bite, and Federal Register rules are routinely effective on signature and published days later. Where the two differ, the register below prints both. A lane label names the regime: the United States lane carries statute, tariff and prosecution alongside BIS rules, and each mark states its own instrument. The axis runs from 1 January 2019 to the date this page was generated (30 August 2026). The earliest entry is dated “Pre-2019” in its source and is pinned to the start; the most recent entry on the record is 10 July 2026. Every mark links to its entry in the register below.
The 21 pairs, tightest first: 6 within 30 days, the other 15 between 31 and 90. A pair is proximity on the axis the plate states; it is not a claim of causation. Same-day and near-same-day pairs are where a coordination reading has the most to explain.
For each technology, which of the three regimes holds a controlling instrument over it, how penetrable the combined restrictions are, and what the combination consists of. The two are different questions and one row answers them differently.
Technology
United States
Netherlands / EU
Japan
Combined penetrability
Holds a controlling instrument
Can the good still move
EUV Lithography
Holds a controlling instrument
Holds a controlling instrument
Holds a controlling instrument
Impenetrable
All three regimes restrict EUV. ASML is the sole manufacturer. No authorized export path exists for EUV systems to China.
Advanced DUV Lithography
No instrument
Holds a controlling instrument
No instrument
Difficult
Netherlands requires licenses for advanced DUV. US and Japan do not separately control DUV. SMIC uses DUV multi-patterning for 7nm-class production.
Advanced AI Chips
Holds a controlling instrument
No instrument
Holds a controlling instrument
Difficult
The US is the binding regime: FDPR extends its jurisdiction to chips made with US equipment or EDA tools, which covers most global production. Japan holds an instrument too — the January 2025 METI expansion names chips themselves, and the October 2025 catch-all makes semiconductors a Core Item — but at thresholds and scope well short of the US advanced-computing rules. The mark records the instrument; the constraint is the United States’.
HBM Memory
Holds a controlling instrument
No instrument
No instrument
Very Difficult
Dec 2024 rule added HBM bandwidth thresholds. SK Hynix (~57%) and Samsung (~22%) are both in US-allied countries. Micron (~21%) is US-based (Q3 2025, Counterpoint Research).
Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment
Holds a controlling instrument
Holds a controlling instrument
Holds a controlling instrument
Very Difficult
US restricts equipment below certain capability thresholds. Japan controls 23 equipment categories (ArF immersion and above). Netherlands expanded controls in April 2025 to cover measurement, testing, inspection, and optimization software beyond lithography. Tokyo Electron and other major equipment manufacturers are Japan-headquartered, giving METI direct licensing authority.
EDA Software
Holds a controlling instrument
Holds a controlling instrument
Holds a controlling instrument
Very Difficult
Synopsys (~32%), Cadence (~30%), and Siemens EDA control ~62% of global market (Synopsys + Cadence alone). US Entity List restrictions are the binding constraint. All three regimes hold an instrument: Japan's January 2025 expansion names CAD software, and the Dutch April 2025 measures reach optimization software for advanced manufacturing — neither reaches design-tool exports the way the US controls do. Chinese EDA alternatives exist but lack advanced node coverage.
Cloud Compute Access
Holds a controlling instrument
No instrument
No instrument
Porous
AI Diffusion Rule (rescinded May 2025) attempted cloud controls. Currently no formal cloud compute export regime. Cloud routing workarounds exist (e.g., ByteDance via Malaysia). The Remote Access Security Act (passed House 369-22, pending Senate) would extend EAR to remote cloud access if enacted.
AI Models
No instrument
Holds a controlling instrument
No instrument
No Restriction
EU AI Act's 10²⁵ FLOP threshold creates obligations for high-impact GPAI models but does not restrict exports. No US or Japan model-level controls. The one row where the two columns diverge: an instrument exists and the good still moves freely.
AssessmentThe regime columns are derived from the action register below: a regime is marked where at least one recorded entry names that technology, so the marks are the record and cannot drift from it. They were hand-curated under this same sentence until 2026-08-14, when two of the eight rows disagreed with the events shown above them. Combined penetrability is Scrutica’s editorial judgment, based on the structure of the restrictions and the number of alternative suppliers, and the ramp above is drawn as ink density: solid for impenetrable, open for no restriction. Where a regime’s instrument reaches a technology only incidentally, the row’s note says so and the mark still stands.
Current posture
United States
Core Oct 2022 and Oct 2023 rules remain in force. AI Diffusion Rule rescinded. H200/MI325X shifted to case-by-case review for China/Macau. Blackwell-class chips (B200/B300/GB200) remain under presumption-of-denial licensing for China. UAE moved from Country Groups D:3/D:4 to A:5 (July 2026) with license-free advanced-computing exports to supplement-no.-8 approved entities. Foundry Due Diligence Rule requires quarterly OSAT/foundry compliance reports. Affiliates Rule suspended through November 9, 2026 under US-China bilateral deal. 25% semiconductor tariff in effect.
Last actionUAE moved to Country Group A:5 — license-free AI-chip exports to approved entities · Jul 10, 2026
Open questions
Will the UAE's bilateral A:5 framework (country-group move + approved-entity supplement) become the template for other Gulf partners, or does the rescinded AI Diffusion Rule get a systematic replacement?
How will case-by-case H200 reviews be adjudicated in practice?
Congressional pushback may re-impose Blackwell-class restrictions
Affiliates Rule reinstates automatically November 10, 2026 unless extended
Chip Security Act hardware tracking mandate pending full House vote
Remote Access Security Act pending Senate vote
December 31, 2026 deadline for approved-IC-designer applications under the Foundry Due Diligence Rule (extended from April 13, 2026 by 91 FR 17851) — how many designers convert, and what happens to those who do not
Super Micro enforcement case pending trial (co-founder pleaded not guilty April 1, 2026)
Netherlands / EU
EUV exports to China blocked since pre-2019. DUV license requirement since Sept 2024, including servicing of previously sold systems. April 2025 expansion covers measurement, testing, inspection, and optimization software. EU AI Act GPAI provisions in effect, with enforcement and fines beginning Aug 2026.
Last actionGPAI Code of Practice applies · Aug 2, 2025
Open questions
Will EU extend DUV restrictions to cover all DUV systems (currently proposed by think tanks)?
How will 10²⁵ FLOP threshold interact with increasingly capable open-source models?
How will April 2025 expanded scope (measurement/testing/inspection software) be enforced?
Japan
Progressive tightening across three rounds: 23 equipment categories restricted (July 2023), expanded to testing/measurement equipment, CAD software, materials, and chips (January 2025), and catch-all amendment creating two-tier Core Items system with informed condition even for ally-country exports (October 2025). All-country application with simplified licensing for 42 Wassenaar partners, but Core Items tier adds METI notification override.
Last actionFEFTA Catch-All Amendment: Core Items Tier · Oct 9, 2025
Open questions
Will Japan further expand to match US December 2024 HBM and advanced packaging controls?
How will the Core Items informed condition be applied in practice for Group A ally countries?
Simplified licensing for Wassenaar partners may create enforcement gaps for non-Core Items
The actions
OrderingNewest first, grouped by year, every year collapsible. Each mark on Plate IV links to its entry here; dates are printed in the form the source uses, with the Federal Register publication date beside it where the two differ.
— 24 earlier entries are folded by year. Printing opens them automatically.
· 8 actions
United StatesJuly 10, 2026 · published 14 Jul 2026
BIS final rule removes the UAE from Country Groups D:3 and D:4 and adds it to A:5, the EAR country group covering close US allies — effective July 10, 2026, published July 14.
Continued
Advanced computing items (AI chips and servers) become license-free where the ultimate consignee and all end users are approved entities in new supplement no. 8 to part 740: UAE Government agencies (including the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces), G42 (Group 42 Holding Ltd) and Core42 — whose authorization auto-expires April 6, 2027 absent subsequent BIS notice — and UAE subsidiaries of Amazon, Apple, Google, Meta, Microsoft, OpenAI, Oracle, and X.AI. License Exception STA separately opens Commerce-controlled military items, certain commercial satellites and spacecraft, and dual-use items for oil/gas production, desalination, and civil nuclear power. Implements the May 2025 US-UAE AI Cooperation framework; the BIS announcement ties the treatment to UAE matching-investment commitments in US AI digital infrastructure, and BIS maintains an Export Control Officer presence in the UAE for end-use monitoring.
91 FR 43034 (2026-14132) · Federal Register; BIS press release (July 10, 2026) · primary source
Analyst publication · Analyst publication (Tier 3) — disclosed short position
TechnologiesAdvanced AI Chips · Cloud Compute Access
Culper Research publishes 40-page short thesis alleging Nvidia continues to service Chinese GPU demand via Southeast Asian intermediaries (Megaspeed International Pte. Ltd. / Speedmatrix Sdn. Bhd., funded via an Apex Enterprise Solutions (Singapore) / Cloud Intelligence (Cayman) / Alibaba Group chain; Aolani; Novagate Cloud; Siam AI Corporation; OBON Corp) and via what the thesis characterizes as rebrand-as-evasion (Inspur Systems Inc. renamed to Aivres Systems Inc. in May 2023, two months after parent Inspur Group's March 2023 addition to the BIS Entity List).
Continued
Builds on the March 19, 2026 Wally Liaw DoJ indictment (the Supermicro / OBON Corp corridor: ~$2.5B purchased, at least ~$510M diverted per the DoJ release) as one corridor among several. Scrutica's licensed corporate-ownership substrate (held under subscription, not redistributed) independently corroborates the corporate-structure facts the thesis cites, at each node that substrate covers; the records themselves are not republished, and the diversion reading built on them remains the thesis's own, at its Tier-3 authority. See /methodology#licensed-substrate for how the licensed layer is held and how it is used. Eight data-quality flags are recorded against these entities.
Extends by about eight months the triggering date for authorized IC designer status and the deadline to apply for approved IC designer status under the January 2025 due-diligence architecture.
Continued
Applications must be received by December 31, 2026; applicants may then be considered authorized IC designers for 180 days. A rule that listed no entities and changed no ECCN — it administers the approved-designer/approved-OSAT machinery that governs whether packaged advanced ICs escape licensing presumptions.
91 FR 17851 (2026-06851) · Federal Register · primary source
Bill — not law · Restriction · Not in force · Proposed Legislation (Committee Passed)
TechnologiesAdvanced AI Chips
H.R. 3447 / S. 1705 (119th Congress). House Foreign Affairs Committee passed 42-0. Requires chips classified under ECCN 3A090, 3A001.z, 4A090, 4A003.z to include hardware-level location verification mechanisms before export. Secretary of Commerce must mandate chip security features within 180 days.
Continued
Triggered by Super Micro indictment. NOT YET LAW: passed committee, pending full House vote, Senate, signature.
Congress.gov / House Select Committee on China · primary source
Yih-Shyan "Wally" Liaw (Supermicro co-founder), Ruei-Tsang Chang (Taiwan GM, fugitive), and Ting-Wei Sun charged in Manhattan federal court with conspiracy to violate the Export Controls Reform Act. Alleged scheme per the DoJ release: a front company purchased approximately $2.5B of AI servers from the manufacturer (unnamed in the release) across 2024-2025; at least approximately $510M worth was diverted to China between late April and mid-May 2025 alone, using false documents, staged dummy servers, and transshipment.
Continued
Largest enforcement case in AI chip export controls to date. Co-founder pleaded not guilty April 1, 2026.
TechnologiesAdvanced AI Chips · Semiconductor Equipment
Presidential Proclamation imposing 25% tariff on advanced AI chips (covered products under ECCN 3A090/4A090), semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and derivative products. Trade measure separate from BIS licensing actions but directly affects chip economics.
Continued
Recorded from the announcement: this entry carries no Federal Register anchor, so its date has not been checked against the proclamation itself and its ordering against the same-day BIS licence-review revision is unverified.
White House announcement · analyst or press report
License review for H200 and AMD MI325X shifted from presumption of denial to case-by-case for China/Macau. Six conditions: commercial availability, supply sufficiency, ≤50% China/Macau allocation cap, prohibited end-use restrictions, KYC due diligence, and third-party US lab testing.
Continued
Blackwell-class (B200+) remains under presumption of denial. A separate 25% tariff on these chips (trade measure, not BIS licensing) is recorded on the same date; that entry carries no Federal Register anchor, so which of the two came first is unverified.
91 FR 1684 (2026-00789) · Federal Register; BIS press release (Jan 2026) · primary source
Bill — not law · Restriction · Not in force · Proposed Legislation (House Passed)
TechnologiesCloud Compute Access
Passed the House 369-22. Extends EAR to cloud compute access — Chinese entities accessing US-controlled chips remotely through offshore cloud/data centers would violate export controls.
Continued
The text linked here is the Senate companion, S. 3519 (McCormick/Wyden/Cotton/Coons); the House bill number is not carried by this record. NOT YET LAW: passed House, pending Senate and Presidential signature.
The Entity List answers who is named; this answers what changed in the regime, and the two move independently. Over the trailing 24 months BIS published 57 rules, 13 touching the advanced-computing regime and 22 changing Entity List membership or its mechanics. Licence-review policy, designer and foundry obligations, and country-group placement all move without a single name being listed, so a stretch with no additions is not a stretch with no enforcement. Rules in those two classes appear in full below; the rest of the docket stays in place, in order, as single rows, each keeping its subject label.
Checked against the Federal Register rule docket 30 Aug 2026 · no BIS rule since 28 Aug 2026. Newest Entity List membership action: 10 Nov 2025.
In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) revises the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by removing two addresses associated with Arrow Electronics (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd. from the Entity List under the destination of China, People's Republic of (China). This determination follows the removal from the Entity List of Arrow China Electronics Trading Co., Ltd., and the removal of six aliases for Arrow Electronics (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd. in November 2025.
In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by removing one entity from the Entity List under the destination of Turkey.
In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to provide enhanced favorable treatment for the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Specifically, BIS is removing the UAE from Country Groups D:3 and D:4 and adding the UAE to Country Group A:5. More license exceptions will now be available, including Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) for the UAE Government and approved commercial entities in the UAE. STA will authorize the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of military items; certain commercial satellites and spacecraft; and dual-use items useful in, inter alia, oil and gas production, desalination, and civil nuclear power generation. The UAE Government and approved commercial entities will also have license-free access to advanced computing items, consistent with the May 2025 U.S.-UAE Artificial Intelligence Cooperation framework, without compromising U.S. digital infrastructure buildout.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is revising the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by extending by about eight months the triggering date for authorized integrated circuit designer status and submission date for applications to become an approved integrated circuit (IC) designer. The new date is December 31, 2026.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is revising its license review policy for exports of certain semiconductors to China and Macau--changing it from a presumption of denial to a case-by-case review. The semiconductors covered by this rule are the Nvidia H200 and its equivalents, as well as less advanced chips--provided that (1) the semiconductors are commercially available in the United States at the time of publication of this rule and (2) the exporter certifies that: there is sufficient supply of this product in the United States; production of this product for exports to China will not divert global foundry capacity for similar or more advanced products for end users in the United States; the recipient has demonstrated sufficient security procedures; and the item undergoes independent, third-party testing in the United States to verify its performance specifications.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is removing one entity from the Entity List under the destination of China, People's Republic of (China). BIS is also removing six aliases associated with a different entity on the Entity List under the destination of China. BIS has determined, based on the review of additional information, that the entities do not pose a significant risk of being or becoming involved in activities that are contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposes a one-year suspension of the interim final rule, "Expansion of End-User Controls to Cover Affiliates of Certain Listed Entities,". The suspension is set to end November 9, 2026, absent a future extension.
In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 29 entries (26 entities and 3 addresses) to the Entity List under the destinations of People's Republic of China (China) (19), Turkey (9), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (1). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
In this interim final rule (IFR), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to address diversion concerns involving entities on the Entity List and certain other restricted end users. Under this IFR, any entity that is at least 50 percent owned by one or more entities on the Entity List will itself automatically be subject to Entity List restrictions. This is a marked improvement over the current standard, which excludes all entities that are not specifically included on the Entity List, regardless of affiliation with Entity List entities. This IFR similarly applies restrictions to entities at least 50 percent owned by listed `military end users' and certain sanctioned parties. The 50 percent ownership standard in this IFR is designed to be consistent with longstanding Department of the Treasury practice, so as to limit the additional burden on the business community.
In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 32 entities to the Entity List. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destination of China, People's Republic of (China) (23), India, (1), Iran (1), Singapore (1), Taiwan (1), Turkey (3), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (2). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. This final rule revises an entry by removing two addresses from one entity under the destination of Russia. Finally, this rule amends 27 existing entries on the Entity List to correct typographical errors under the following destinations: Belarus (3), China (11), Iran (1), Pakistan (1), Russia (9), and Turkey (2).
In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to revise the existing Validated End-User (VEU) Authorizations list for the People's Republic of China (PRC) by removing Intel Semiconductor (Dalian) Ltd; Samsung China Semiconductor Co. Ltd; and SK hynix Semiconductor (China) Ltd.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 18 persons to the Unverified List (UVL). Of the 18 persons being added: five are under the destination of China, People's Republic of (China); six are under the destination of Finland; three are under the destination of T[uuml]rkiye; two are under the destination of Kazakhstan; one is under the destination of Italy; and one is under the destination of the United Kingdom. BIS is also amending the EAR by removing five persons from the UVL. Of the five persons being removed, three are under the destination of China and two are under the destination of the United Arab Emirates.
In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 12 entities to the Entity List, under the destinations of China, People's Republic of (China) (11) and Taiwan (1). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 70 entities to the Entity List, under the destinations of China, People's Republic of (China) (42); Iran (2); Pakistan (19); South Africa (3); and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (4). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. This final rule also modifies four existing entries on the Entity List, consisting of revisions to one entry under France, one entry under Iran, one entry under Senegal, and one entry under the United Kingdom.
On January 16, 2025, BIS published in the Federal Register an interim final rule (IFR), "Implementation of Additional Due Diligence Measures for Advanced Computing Integrated Circuits; Amendments and Clarifications; and Extension of Comment Period" (January 16 IFR). This rule revises Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 3A090 to correct this ECCN's license requirement added in the January 16 IFR.
BIS is revising the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in response to requests from the public to provide additional due diligence procedures regarding advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs). This interim final rule (IFR) will protect the national security of the United States and assist foundries and Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test ("OSATs") companies in complying with provisions of the EAR pertaining to advanced computing ICs in the supply chain. This IFR also revises the EAR to make amendments and clarifications to the EAR for changes made to the EAR in an IFR released by BIS on December 2, 2024, "Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items," (FDP IFR), including extending the deadline for written comments for the FDP IFR to March 14, 2025.
In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 11 entities under 11 entries to the Entity List. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destination of China, People's Republic of (China) (11). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security and/or foreign policy interests of the United States. This rule also revises one existing entry on the Entity List under the destination of India.
In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 16 entities to the Entity List, under the destinations of China, People's Republic of (China) (14) and Singapore (2). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
On January 10, 2025, the Office of the Federal Register posted for public inspection a Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) interim final rule: "Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion" (RIN 0694-AJ90). This document announces that, on January 15, 2025, BIS will host a virtual public briefing on this rule. This document also provides details on the procedures for participating in the virtual public briefing.
With this interim final rule, the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) revises the Export Administration Regulations' (EAR) controls on advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs) and adds a new control on artificial intelligence (AI) model weights for certain advanced closed-weight dual-use AI models. In conjunction with the expansion of these controls, which BIS has determined are necessary to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, BIS is adding new license exceptions and updating the Data Center Validated End User authorization to facilitate the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of advanced computing (ICs) to end users in destinations that do not raise national security or foreign policy concerns. Together, these changes will cultivate secure ecosystems for the responsible diffusion and use of AI and advanced computing ICs.
In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 entities under 13 entries to the Entity List. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destinations of Burma (1), China, People's Republic of (China) (11), and Pakistan (1). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security and/ or foreign policy interests of the United States. This rule also amends the EAR by making certain editorial corrections and clarifications. BIS is making the corrections and clarifications in order to minimize confusion and not impede the free flow of commerce.
In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 8 entities to the Entity List, under the destinations of Burma (2), China, People's Republic of (China) (2), and Russia (4). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
Entity List membership · advanced computing · Rule
Abstract
In this interim final rule (IFR), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) makes changes to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) controls for certain advanced computing items, supercomputers, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which includes adding new controls for certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment and related items, creating new Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules for certain commodities to impair the capability to produce "advanced-node integrated circuits" ("advanced-node ICs") by certain destinations or entities of concern, adding new controls for certain high bandwidth memory important for advanced computing, and clarifying controls on certain software keys that allow for the use of items such as software tools. This IFR publishes concurrently with another BIS final rule entitled, "Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; and Removals from the Validated End-User (VEU) Program" (Entity List rule) that adds to and modifies the Entity List to ensure appropriate EAR controls are in place for certain critical technologies and to minimize the risk of diversion to entities of concern.
Entity List membership · advanced computing · Rule
Abstract
In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 140 entities to the Entity List. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destinations of China, People's Republic of (China), Japan, South Korea, and Singapore and have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. This final rule also modifies 14 existing entries on the Entity List, consisting of revisions to 14 entries under China. This final rule publishes concurrently with BIS's interim final rule, "Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items" (0694-AJ74), which makes additional changes to the EAR controls on advanced computing items and semiconductor manufacturing items. This final rule is part of this larger effort to ensure that appropriate EAR controls are in place on these items, including in connection with transactions destined to or otherwise involving the entities being added to the Entity List, as well as for existing entries on the Entity List that are being modified. All of these entities (those newly added and those being modified) are involved with the development and production of "advanced-node integrated circuits" ("advanced-node ICs") and/or semiconductor manufacturing items, and/or have supported the Chinese government's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy. Additionally, this final rule designates nine of these entities being added and seven of the entries being modified as entities for which entity-specific restrictions involving foreign-produced items apply. This final rule also amends the EAR by removing three entities from the Validated End- User (VEU) Program.
Entity List membership · advanced computing · Rule
Abstract
On December 2, 2024, the Office of the Federal Register posted for public inspection two related Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) rules: an interim final rule, "Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items," (RIN 0694-AJ74) and a final rule, "Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; Removals from the Validated End-User (VEU) Program" (RIN 0694-AJ77). This document announces that, on December 5, 2024, BIS will host a virtual public briefing on these rules. This document also provides details on the procedures for participating in the virtual public briefing.
In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) makes changes to the export controls against Russia and Belarus under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). This final rule expands the scope of the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions by imposing controls on nine key precursors for riot control agents and a chemical weapon that Russia has deployed against Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This final rule also makes adjustments to exclusions, exceptions, and licensing policy for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) to certain components of the governments of Country Group A:5 and A:6 destinations that are in Russia and Belarus. Lastly, this final rule clarifies that the Russia/ Belarus-Military End User and Procurement Foreign-Direct Product (FDP) rule and the EAR's other Entity List FDP rules' license requirements extend to or within any destination or to any end user or party that otherwise meets the criteria. This final rule is being published concurrently with a BIS final rule, "Additions and Revisions of Entities to the Entity List" (RIN 0694-AJ94), which includes additional changes related to export controls related to Russia and Belarus.
In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 40 entities under 42 entries and four addresses under four entries to the Entity List. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destinations of China, People's Republic of (China) (11), India (5), Malaysia (2), Russia (13), Singapore (1), and Turkey (14). Two entities are added to the Entity List under two destinations, which accounts for the difference in the totals. This final rule also modifies 52 existing entries on the Entity List under the destinations of China, Estonia, Finland, India, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United Kingdom. These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. This final rule is being published concurrently with a BIS final rule, "Implementation of Additional Export Controls Against Russia and Belarus Under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR); and Clarifications" (RIN 0694-AJ93), which includes additional changes related to export controls related to Russia and Belarus.
In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 26 entries to the Entity List, under the destinations of the People's Republic of China (China), Egypt, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and modifies one existing entry under the destination of China. This rule also removes two entities from the entity list: one entity listed under the destination of China, and a second entity listed under the destinations of Canada, India, Japan, Malaysia, Sweden and the UAE.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding eight persons to the Unverified List (UVL). Of the eight persons being added, three are under the destination of China, People's Republic of (China); two are under the destination of Germany; one is under the destination of Pakistan; and two are under the destination of T[uuml]rkiye. BIS is also amending the EAR by removing two persons from the UVL. Of the two persons being removed, one is under the destination of Saudi Arabia, and the other is under the destination of China.
In this rule, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to expand the Validated End User Authorization (VEU) program to include VEU Authorization for data centers located in specified destinations ("Data Center VEU" or "Data Center VEU Authorization"). This expansion of the VEU program to include Data Center VEU is intended to facilitate quick and reliable export or reexport of items on the Commerce Control List necessary for a data center, including advanced computing items, to preapproved trusted end users. Data Center VEU adopts much of the framework of the existing VEU program, with additional requirements. This expansion of eligibility is intended to update the VEU program to recognize the advancement and benefits of artificial intelligence. As under the original VEU Authorization Program, the U.S. government will rigorously review Data Center VEU candidates' applications subject to detailed and verifiable criteria.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is implementing export controls on several semiconductor, quantum, and additive manufacturing items for national security and foreign policy reasons. This rule adds new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) to the Commerce Control List, revises existing ECCNs, adds a new license exception to authorize exports and reexports to and by countries that have implemented equivalent technical controls for these newly added items, and adds two new worldwide license requirements to the national security and regional stability controls in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). These controls are the product of extensive discussions with international partners.
Federal Register documents of type Rule (final and interim final) for the Bureau of Industry and Security, published on or after 30 Aug 2024, newest first: 22 entity list membership · 8 destination scope · 7 advanced-computing controls · 20 other ear business. Document metadata is verbatim from the Federal Register API (authority tier 1); the subject label and the advanced-computing flag are keyword classifications over the title and abstract, shown per row so a disputed call stays visible. 5 of 57 carry no abstract in the Federal Register API (mostly correction documents) and were classified from the title alone, which reads the advanced-computing payload less reliably. BIS enforcement notices (temporary denial orders and denials of export privileges) publish in the Federal Register as Notices; this docket covers Rules, so they are not tracked here.
Did these controls actually change trade flows? The trade impact analysis reads fifteen years of bilateral semiconductor trade against each BIS action, corridor by corridor.