| Chips sent to a country |
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| Advanced computing items are exported to China or another country under a US arms embargo (Country Group D:5), or to Macau. | A licence is required; applications are reviewed under a presumption of denial, except that exports of commodities under 21,000 TPP and 6,500 GB/s of total DRAM bandwidth to end users in China or Macau are reviewed case by case if the applicant gives the additional information required. § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A), p. 26; § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(2), p. 27; § 742.6(b)(10)(iii)(A)(2), p. 28 | A licence is required for these items, for ECCN 3A090.a chips under the requirement covering every destination and for ECCN 3A090.b chips under the one covering Country Groups D:1, D:4 and D:5, and applications are reviewed under the same presumption of denial and the same case-by-case exception. 15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A); 15 CFR 742.6(b)(10)(iii)(A)(1) | 2 sources |
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| Advanced computing items go to a company headquartered in an arms-embargoed country or Macau, or whose ultimate parent company is, in a country outside Country Groups D:1, D:4 and D:5 or in one of them that is also in Country Group A:5 or A:6. | A licence is required for these items, ECCN 3A090.a chips included, and where the destination is Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil or Thailand the application is reviewed under the presumption of denial for such companies. § 744.23(a)(3)(i)(A), p. 32; § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1), p. 27; § 742.6(b)(10)(iii)(A)(2), p. 28 | Exporting these items to such a company needs a licence, under the requirement for such companies for ECCN 3A090.b chips and under the requirement covering every destination for ECCN 3A090.a chips. BIS guidance of 31 May 2026, para. 1; 15 CFR 744.23(a)(3)(i)(A); 15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A) | 3 sources |
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| Advanced computing items are exported to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil or Thailand. | A licence is required, and applications are reviewed case by case for whether the transaction is contrary to US national security or foreign policy interests, including the effectiveness of the country's export controls and its coordination with the Bureau of Industry and Security on enforcement, although applications for a company headquartered in an arms-embargoed country or Macau, or whose ultimate parent company is, are reviewed under a presumption of denial. § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A), p. 26; § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1), p. 27; § 742.6(b)(10)(iii)(A)(1), p. 28 Preamble of the released ruleThe summary extends the requirement to any further country the Secretary of Commerce designates in consultation with the Secretary of State or the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, while the operative paragraph lists only Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil and Thailand. Summary, p. 1; § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1), p. 27 | A licence is required for ECCN 3A090.a chips and the items listed with them to or within any destination worldwide. 15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A) | none held |
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| In Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil or Thailand, the ultimate consignee or end user is headquartered in the United States, or its ultimate parent company is. | The licence requirement for those countries does not apply if the exporter follows the monthly reporting the rule sets out, and the exclusion covers that requirement alone. Note 1 to § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1), p. 27; § 743.10(a), p. 29; § 743.10(d), p. 30 | A licence is required for ECCN 3A090.a chips and the items listed with them to or within any destination worldwide. 15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A) | none held |
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| Advanced computing items are exported to a country in Country Group D:1 or D:4 other than Macau that is in neither Country Group D:5 nor Country Group A:5 or A:6, or to the United Arab Emirates. | A licence is required, and applications are reviewed under a presumption of approval unless they are for an entity headquartered in an arms-embargoed country or Macau or with its ultimate parent there, when the presumption is of denial; this requirement does not apply where the ultimate consignee and all end users are approved entities in the United Arab Emirates listed for these items. § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(2), p. 27; § 742.6(b)(10)(iii)(A)(2), p. 28 | A licence is required for these items, for ECCN 3A090.a chips under the requirement covering every destination and for ECCN 3A090.b chips under the one covering the United Arab Emirates and Country Groups D:1, D:4 and D:5, which does not apply where the ultimate consignee and all end users are approved entities in the United Arab Emirates listed for these items. 15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A) | none held |
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| Advanced computing items are exported to any other country. | In the passages searched, the released text sets no licence requirement on these items for the destination alone, while the requirements that turn on the headquarters of the company the items are for, or on a data centre's customers, can apply. § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A), p. 26; Preamble, p. 12; § 744.23(a)(3)(i)(A), p. 32; § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33 | A licence is required for ECCN 3A090.a chips and the items listed with them to or within any destination worldwide. 15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A) | none held |
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| Data centres that give such companies access |
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| A data centre outside the United States gives companies headquartered in an arms-embargoed country or Macau, or whose ultimate parent company is, access to more than 12,000,000 aggregate TPP, at that data centre or through data centres linked to it. | Exporting, reexporting or transferring the listed advanced computing items needs a licence when there is knowledge that they are destined to a data centre that is giving or will give such access; licence exceptions do not apply except as the Bureau of Industry and Security notes when a destination is designated, and applications are reviewed case by case. § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33; § 744.24(b)(1), p. 35; § 744.24(c), p. 36 | Renting such companies time on these chips in a data centre abroad needs no licence in the Bureau's 2009 reading, though it said in 2025 that certain activities may trigger a licence requirement under its catch-all controls when there is knowledge that an AI model will be used for a weapons of mass destruction or military-intelligence end use or end user. BIS Advisory Opinion, 13 Jan 2009, p. 2, answer (1); BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1 | 7 sources |
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| A data centre was giving such companies a significant volume of compute before the rule's publication and wants to continue.90 days from publication | It must obtain a licence within 90 days of the rule's effective date or face future export restrictions. § 744.24(b)(3), p. 36; DATES, p. 3 A question the released text leaves openThe section defines neither a significant volume of compute nor the future export restrictions. § 744.24(b)(3), p. 36; § 744.24(d)(1), p. 36; § 744.24(d)(2), p. 36 | Renting such companies time on these chips in a data centre abroad needs no licence in the Bureau's 2009 reading, though it said in 2025 that certain activities may trigger a licence requirement under its catch-all controls when there is knowledge that an AI model will be used for a weapons of mass destruction or military-intelligence end use or end user. BIS Advisory Opinion, 13 Jan 2009, p. 2, answer (1); BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1 | 7 sources |
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| A data centre outside the United States that received the chips without a licence later begins giving such companies access to more than 12,000,000 aggregate TPP. | The requirement applies whether or not the holder of the chips was a party to the original export, and whoever exports, reexports or transfers the chips without authorisation on or after publication must tell the recipient that the operator needs authorisation for such a change of end use. Note 1 to § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33; § 744.24(e), p. 37 Preamble of the released ruleThe preamble says in one place that an authorisation may be required on such a change of end use, and elsewhere that the change counts as a transfer (in-country) and requires one. Preamble, p. 9; Preamble, p. 12 | A change in end use or end user within the same foreign country is a transfer (in-country), and the Bureau has said such a transfer of chips a cloud provider already holds may need a licence under its catch-all controls where there is knowledge that the AI models trained for such companies will be used for a weapons of mass destruction or military-intelligence end use or end user. 15 CFR 734.16; BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1; BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1, second bullet | 7 sources |
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| The access is only for a commercial recommender system. | The requirement does not apply if the access is only for a commercial recommender system and the exporter submits to the Bureau of Industry and Security the customer's name, the summed total processing performance of the chips provided to or for it, and the diligence done to ensure the access is provided only for that purpose. § 744.24(b)(2), p. 35; § 744.24(d)(1), p. 36 Preamble of the released ruleThe preamble says bona fide data-centre operators already giving access for commercial recommender systems may continue for 90 days and must then obtain a licence to continue. Preamble, p. 14 A question the released text leaves openThe operative exclusion and the preamble's licence after 90 days point different ways, and the released text does not reconcile them. § 744.24(b)(2), p. 35; Preamble, p. 14 | Renting such companies time on these chips in a data centre abroad needs no licence in the Bureau's 2009 reading, though it said in 2025 that certain activities may trigger a licence requirement under its catch-all controls when there is knowledge that an AI model will be used for a weapons of mass destruction or military-intelligence end use or end user. BIS Advisory Opinion, 13 Jan 2009, p. 2, answer (1); BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1 | 7 sources |
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| Such companies get access to 12,000,000 aggregate TPP or less at one data centre and the data centres linked to it. | The data-centre prohibition sets no licence requirement on exports to a data centre that gives such companies access to 12,000,000 aggregate TPP or less, unless the Bureau of Industry and Security informs those concerned that a licence is required. § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33; § 744.24(a)(2), p. 34 Preamble of the released ruleThe preamble says the requirement on exports for companies headquartered in an arms-embargoed country or Macau has always extended to exports on their behalf, as where such a company is the purchaser or the exclusive or primary remote end user, with more than 50 percent of the data centre's compute. Preamble, p. 13 | Renting such companies time on these chips in a data centre abroad needs no licence in the Bureau's 2009 reading, though it said in 2025 that certain activities may trigger a licence requirement under its catch-all controls when there is knowledge that an AI model will be used for a weapons of mass destruction or military-intelligence end use or end user. BIS Advisory Opinion, 13 Jan 2009, p. 2, answer (1); BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1 | 7 sources |
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| One such company spreads its use over data centres that are not linked, each giving such companies 12,000,000 aggregate TPP or less. | The data-centre prohibition counts access at one data centre or through linked data centres, so it sets no licence requirement on this case, unless the Bureau of Industry and Security informs those concerned that a licence is required. § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33; § 744.24(d)(2), p. 36; § 744.24(a)(2), p. 34 | Renting such companies time on these chips in a data centre abroad needs no licence in the Bureau's 2009 reading, though it said in 2025 that certain activities may trigger a licence requirement under its catch-all controls when there is knowledge that an AI model will be used for a weapons of mass destruction or military-intelligence end use or end user. BIS Advisory Opinion, 13 Jan 2009, p. 2, answer (1); BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1 | 7 sources |
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| A company headquartered elsewhere gets access to more than 12,000,000 aggregate TPP at a data centre and trains AI models for, or supplies them to, a company headquartered in an arms-embargoed country or Macau. | The requirement counts access given to such companies or for them. § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33 Preamble of the released ruleThe preamble says access is for a Country Group D:5 company where there is knowledge that a data centre gives it to a non-D:5 customer that trains AI models for, helps train them for, or supplies them to that company. Preamble, p. 8 | Renting such access needs no licence in the Bureau's 2009 reading, though it said in 2025 that a transfer (in-country) of chips a cloud provider already holds may need a licence under its catch-all controls where there is knowledge that they will be used to train AI models for or on behalf of such companies and that a model will be used for a weapons of mass destruction or military-intelligence end use or end user. BIS Advisory Opinion, 13 Jan 2009, p. 2, answer (1); BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1; BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1, second bullet | 7 sources |
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| A customer headquartered outside an arms-embargoed country and Macau is owned or controlled from one, but its ultimate parent company is headquartered elsewhere. | The requirement turns on where a company or its ultimate parent company is headquartered, while the diligence the exporter is expected to obtain asks whether customers are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by persons located or headquartered in such a country or Macau. § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33; Note 3 to § 744.24(a)(1), p. 34 A question the released text leaves openWhether ownership or control short of an ultimate parent brings a customer within the requirement is left open by the released text. § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33; Note 3 to § 744.24(a)(1), p. 34 | The end-user requirement for such entities abroad turns on the same two facts, where the entity is headquartered and where its ultimate parent company is. 15 CFR 744.23(a)(3)(i)(A); BIS guidance of 31 May 2026, para. 1 | 7 sources |
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| The customer is a university, a research institute or a state body headquartered in an arms-embargoed country or Macau. | The requirement, the recommender exclusion, the paragraph on data centres already giving access and the notice all describe the customer as a company. § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33; § 744.24(b)(2), p. 35; § 744.24(b)(3), p. 36; § 744.24(e), p. 37 Preamble of the released ruleThe preamble's background, in its first description of the requirement, speaks of access for an entity. Preamble, I. Background, p. 4 A question the released text leaves openWhether access for a customer that is not a company falls under the requirement is left open by the released text. § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33; Preamble, I. Background, p. 4 | Renting such access needs no licence in the Bureau's 2009 reading, though it said in 2025 that certain activities may trigger a licence requirement under its catch-all controls when there is knowledge that an AI model will be used for a weapons of mass destruction or military-intelligence end use or end user; the end-user requirement for exports abroad speaks of any entity headquartered in such a country or Macau. BIS Advisory Opinion, 13 Jan 2009, p. 2, answer (1); BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1; 15 CFR 744.23(a)(3)(i)(A) | 7 sources |
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| The customer is headquartered in Hong Kong. | The words Hong Kong do not appear in the released text, whose requirement names Macau and Country Group D:5. § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33 | A note on export filings says Hong Kong is considered a part of the People's Republic of China under the Export Administration Regulations. Note 1 to 15 CFR 758.1(b)(10) | none held |
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| The data centre is in the United States. | The requirement covers items destined to such a data centre in any destination worldwide and applies to their export, reexport or transfer (in-country). § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33 Preamble of the released ruleThe summary speaks of overseas data centres, and the preamble of data centres outside the United States and of data centres wherever located. Summary, p. 1; Preamble, p. 13; Preamble, I. Background, p. 4 A question the released text leaves openThe released text does not settle whether a data centre in the United States falls within the requirement. § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33; Preamble, p. 13 | The regulations define an export to include a shipment or transmission out of the United States, a reexport to include one from one foreign country to another, and a transfer (in-country) as a change in end use or end user within the same foreign country. 15 CFR 734.13(a)(1); 15 CFR 734.14(a)(1); 15 CFR 734.16 | none held |
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| A data centre gives such companies access to some of its chips, and the 12,000,000 aggregate TPP has to be counted. | The requirement turns on whether a data centre is providing or will provide access to more than 12,000,000 aggregate TPP, at that data centre or through linked data centres, to or for such companies, and aggregate TPP is the sum of the total processing performance of a group of the listed chips. § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33; § 772.1, Aggregate TPP, p. 44 A question the released text leaves openThe words can be read as counting the chips one such company can use, the chips all such companies can use together, or all the chips at the data centre and those linked to it, and the released text chooses none of these readings. § 744.24(a)(1), p. 33; § 772.1, Aggregate TPP, p. 44 | Rented access needs no licence at any aggregate TPP in the Bureau's 2009 reading, though it said in 2025 that certain activities may trigger a licence requirement under its catch-all controls when there is knowledge that an AI model will be used for a weapons of mass destruction or military-intelligence end use or end user. BIS Advisory Opinion, 13 Jan 2009, p. 2, answer (1); BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1 | 7 sources |
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| What an exporter must ask and tell |
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| An exporter ships the listed advanced computing items to a foreign data centre. | To show it lacks knowledge, the exporter is expected to obtain, and be able to provide, enough information from the data centre about its know-your-customer checks, and a data centre that declines or cannot provide information enough to verify compliance raises a red flag that presumptively gives the exporter knowledge unless the exporter resolves it before proceeding. Note 3 to § 744.24(a)(1), p. 34 Preamble of the released ruleThe summary says data centres, foreign foundries and chip exporters must perform due diligence on their customers, and the preamble describes the note as setting expectations for US persons and foreign data centres. Summary, p. 1; Preamble, p. 10 | The know-your-customer guidance does not mention data centres, and its red flag on computing services concerns assistance in training an AI model whose weights ECCN 4E091 controls. Supplement no. 3 to part 732, red flag 28 | none held |
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| On or after publication, an exporter ships the listed items without a licence because it has no knowledge of a prohibited end use and no other licence requirement applies. | The exporter must tell the recipient that an authorisation from the Bureau of Industry and Security is required if the items will be used at a data centre giving access to more than 12,000,000 aggregate TPP to or for companies headquartered in an arms-embargoed country or Macau, or whose ultimate parent company is. § 744.24(e), p. 37 | In the passages searched, the regulations in force require no notice of this kind, and a later change in end use or end user within the same foreign country is a transfer (in-country). 15 CFR 734.16 | none held |
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| A data centre operator receives the listed items with that notice. | The notice must say that the transferor, such as the data centre operator, must obtain authorisation for the change of end use and must follow the know-your-customer guidance in the regulations. § 744.24(e), p. 37 | A change in end use or end user within the same foreign country is a transfer (in-country), and the Bureau has said such a transfer of chips a cloud provider already holds may need a licence under its catch-all controls where there is knowledge that the AI models trained for such companies will be used for a weapons of mass destruction or military-intelligence end use or end user. 15 CFR 734.16; BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1; BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1, second bullet | none held |
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