Pairs

A disruption to electricity infrastructure could affect both Saudi data centres and petroleum facilities.

Each group runs nearest first. All distances are approximate. Line weight on the chart follows these groups.

Data centre	Petroleum or desalination site	Distance	Substation
Named shared substation, 2 pairs
Google Cloud Dammam	Ras Tanura Refinery & TerminalFaras 380 kV	24 km	Faras 380 kV
Aramco Digital DC (Dhahran)	Abqaiq Processing FacilityAbqaiq 380 kV	60 km	Abqaiq 380 kV
Same grid zone, 6 pairs
Aramco Digital DC (Dhahran)	Ras Tanura Refinery & Terminal	39 km
Google Cloud Dammam	Abqaiq Processing Facility	69 km
Google Cloud Dammam	Jubail Industrial Complex (SATORP)	78 km
Google Cloud Dammam	Jubail Desalination Plant	81 km
Aramco Digital DC (Dhahran)	Jubail Industrial Complex (SATORP)	93 km
Aramco Digital DC (Dhahran)	Jubail Desalination Plant	96 km
Within 200 km, different zones, 4 pairs
AWS Saudi Arabia (announced region)	Khurais Oil Field	150 km
DataVolt Hyperscale (Riyadh)	Khurais Oil Field	150 km
Oracle Cloud Riyadh	Khurais Oil Field	154 km
STC Data Center (Riyadh)	Khurais Oil Field	155 km

HUMAIN announced a Saudi data-centre partnership with xAI on 19 November 2025. NEOM subsequently reported HUMAIN and DataVolt starting construction at Oxagon on 31 August 2026. Neither project has an assigned electricity connection in this map, so their exposure to the petroleum and desalination facilities shown here is unassessed. Saudi Arabia’s AI programme

Grid

All 14 site records and 8 substations. 7 of the 8 substation locations are analyst estimates.

A year printed beside a site is its first recorded attack.

Grid zone	Data centres	Petroleum and desalination sites
Eastern Province	Google Cloud Dammam, Aramco Digital	Abqaiq attacked 2019, Khurais attacked 2019, Ras Tanura attacked 2021, Jubail Industrial, Shaybah attacked 2019, Jubail Desalination
Riyadh	AWS Saudi Arabia, Oracle Cloud Riyadh, STC Data Center, DataVolt Hyperscale	None
Western Province	Oracle Cloud Jeddah	Yanbu

Substation	Voltage	Assigned sites
Abqaiq	380 kV	Abqaiq, Aramco Digital
Dhahran	230 kV	Aramco Digital, Google Cloud Dammam
Eastern Coast	400 kV	Ras Tanura, Shaybah
Faras	380 kV	Ras Tanura, Google Cloud Dammam
Jubail	380 kV	Jubail Industrial, Jubail Desalination
Khurais	380 kV	Khurais, Abqaiq
Qaisumah	380 kV	None
Riyadh North	400 kV	AWS Saudi Arabia, Oracle Cloud Riyadh, STC Data Center, DataVolt Hyperscale

History

These dated accounts describe attacks on named sites and the damage and recovery reported for particular operations.

The compute cases add an assumed interruption to electricity infrastructure.

Aramco reported a suspension of 5.7 million barrels per day on 14 September 2019. Its 17 September update reported partial restoration; the initial loss was not sustained at that level for two weeks.

Date	Site	Account
25 Mar 2022	North JeddahThe Saudi Ministry of Energy reported an attack on the petroleum-products distribution station in North Jeddah.	The Saudi Ministry of Energy reported an attack on the petroleum-products distribution station in North Jeddah.
7 Mar 2021	Ras TanuraThe GCC reported a drone attack on petroleum storage at Ras Tanura. Its statement separately identifies a ballistic-missile attack on Aramco facilities in Dhahran on the same date.	The GCC reported a drone attack on petroleum storage at Ras Tanura. Its statement separately identifies a ballistic-missile attack on Aramco facilities in Dhahran on the same date.
14 Sep 2019	AbqaiqAramco reported attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais that initially suspended 5.7 million barrels per day of production across the two sites. The statement does not assign that combined loss to Abqaiq alone.	Aramco reported attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais that initially suspended 5.7 million barrels per day of production across the two sites. The statement does not assign that combined loss to Abqaiq alone.
14 Sep 2019	KhuraisKhurais was attacked on the same day as Abqaiq. Aramco’s initial statement reported the production interruption across both sites; it did not give separate site-level restoration times.	Khurais was attacked on the same day as Abqaiq. Aramco’s initial statement reported the production interruption across both sites; it did not give separate site-level restoration times.
17 Aug 2019	ShaybahAramco’s annual report describes five UAVs damaging processing and cogeneration infrastructure. One NGL train resumed operations within two weeks.	Aramco’s annual report describes five UAVs damaging processing and cogeneration infrastructure. One NGL train resumed operations within two weeks.

Cases

Each case keeps its authored assumptions, and predicts no attack or power loss.

Case	Targets	Data centres	Assumed outage
Repeat of 2019	Abqaiq24–72 hours, or weeks	Google Cloud Dammam, Aramco Digital	24–72 hours, or weeks
Drone attack	Abqaiq, Ras Tanura, Jubail IndustrialDays to weeks	Google Cloud Dammam, Aramco Digital	Days to weeks
Grid attack	Grid infrastructure in the Eastern ProvinceWeeks to months	Google Cloud Dammam, Aramco Digital	Weeks to months
Combined attack	Abqaiq, Ras TanuraHours to weeks	Google Cloud Dammam, Aramco Digital, AWS Saudi Arabia, STC Data Center	Hours to weeks

Repeat of 2019

Low-altitude cruise missiles + drone swarm from west/northwest

Authored scenario assumption. No attack likelihood, electricity failure or backup performance is calculated.

A repeat disruption at Abqaiq is assumed to damage electricity infrastructure shared with nearby data centres. The 2019 attack provides the petroleum-disruption precedent. A data-centre outage would additionally require loss of its power supply and insufficient backup; neither condition is established by a shared grid-zone label.

Targets: Abqaiq
Data centres: Google Cloud Dammam, Aramco Digital
Affected grid zones: Eastern Province
Assumed outage: 24–72 hours (backup generators), or weeks if grid substations damaged

Aramco reported a suspension of 5.7 million barrels per day on 14 September 2019. Its 17 September update reported partial restoration; the initial loss was not sustained at that level for two weeks.

Aramco incident and restoration statements, 14 and 17 September 2019: https://www.aramco.com/en/news-media/news/2019/incidents-at-abqaiq-and-khurais; https://www.aramco.com/en/news-media/news/2019/saudi-aramco-swiftly-restores-production-capacity

Research database

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Drone attack

Large drone swarm (100+) from Yemen targeting multiple Eastern Province facilities simultaneously

Authored scenario assumption. No attack likelihood, electricity failure or backup performance is calculated.

Several Eastern Province petroleum facilities are assumed to be disrupted at the same time. The scenario groups the data centres assigned to the affected grid zone. It does not calculate how many weapons would penetrate defences or which electricity connections would fail.

Targets: Abqaiq, Ras Tanura, Jubail Industrial
Data centres: Google Cloud Dammam, Aramco Digital
Affected grid zones: Eastern Province
Assumed outage: Days to weeks (multiple grid nodes affected)

Houthi drone escalation trajectory 2019-2024. Red Sea campaign demonstrated 100+ drone/missile salvos.

CSIS; IISS

Press or analyst

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Grid attack

Precision strike on Eastern Province grid substations and transmission infrastructure

Authored scenario assumption. No attack likelihood, electricity failure or backup performance is calculated.

An interruption to Eastern Province electricity infrastructure is assumed to affect both petroleum facilities and data centres. The map identifies sites assigned to that grid zone. Outage extent would depend on the damaged connections, alternative supplies and backup arrangements, which this assessment does not simulate.

Targets: Grid infrastructure in the Eastern Province
Data centres: Google Cloud Dammam, Aramco Digital
Affected grid zones: Eastern Province
Assumed outage: Weeks to months (transformer replacement lead time is 6–12 months for custom HV units)

Ukraine grid attacks 2022-2024 demonstrated vulnerability of civilian grid to military targeting. Transformer replacement is the critical constraint.

Ukraine grid attack analysis; DOE transformer reports

Press or analyst

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Combined attack

Simultaneous drone swarm + ballistic missiles + cyber

Authored scenario assumption. No attack likelihood, electricity failure or backup performance is calculated.

Concurrent physical damage and disruption to grid-control systems are assumed to affect the Eastern and Central zones. The case selects Google Cloud Dammam, Aramco Digital, AWS Saudi Arabia and STC Data Center. Oracle Cloud Riyadh and DataVolt Hyperscale also have an assignment in an affected grid zone but are outside the case’s selected set; the records give no reason for the selection.

Targets: Abqaiq, Ras Tanura
Data centres: Google Cloud Dammam, Aramco Digital, AWS Saudi Arabia, STC Data Center
Affected grid zones: Eastern Province, Riyadh
Assumed outage: Hours (kinetic) to weeks (if cyber component degrades grid management)

The combination of physical and grid-control disruption is a scenario assumption. The cited regional conflict history does not establish this combined outcome for Saudi electricity infrastructure.

Iran-Israel conflict analysis; CSIS; CRS

Press or analyst

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Sources

Reviewed 18 Jul 2026, 26 days past its due date. Newest input August 2026.

4 sources

Source
Saudi Energy Infrastructure
Aramco Disclosures
Aramco restoration statement, 17 September 2019
Scrutica facilities register

Saudi Energy Infrastructure: https://www.aramco.com/
Aramco Disclosures: https://www.aramco.com/en/investors
Aramco restoration statement, 17 September 2019: https://www.aramco.com/en/news-media/news/2019/saudi-aramco-swiftly-restores-production-capacity
Scrutica facilities register: https://scrutica.com/methodology

Data

CSV

Data centresEvery site, lifecycle stage, unknown power/backup fields, programme association and downstream compute scope.

Petroleum and desalination sitesEvery site and type, reported capacity or unknown, grid assignment and attack history.

Screened pairsStable pair keys, evidence classes, distance estimates, endpoint and shared-substation sources; screening radius is not a damage radius.

Regional grid zonesAll generation fields including unknowns, memberships, notes and sources.

SubstationsEvery named assignment, voltage and location-estimate distinction.

Historical incidentsEvery petroleum event, including source URLs and unknown facility joins.

Authored casesEvery attack vector, target/site/zone set, outage assumption, historical basis and source.

JSON

Data centres

Petroleum and desalination sites

JSON with provenance

Data centres

Petroleum and desalination sites

How the figures were made

The scenario assumes that damage near a petroleum or desalination facility interrupts electricity supplied to a data centre. Shared substations and regional grid zones identify connections to investigate.

Distances are calculated from facility coordinates; a ~ marks a distance where at least one endpoint's coordinates are analyst-estimated. Substation and grid-zone assignments determine the table's groups. The 200 km radius determines which pairs enter the table; it does not describe how far an electrical failure could propagate.

The assessment examines possible data-centre power losses after damage to electricity infrastructure near petroleum and desalination facilities. The Iran range map provides separate geographic context for published missile ranges and compute locations.

A distance screen selects facility pairs. Each pair is then grouped by its strongest recorded connection: a named substation, a regional grid zone or geographic proximity. Shared zone means the records have the same regional grid assignment without a common named substation, so no common point of power failure is identified.

Some substation assignments are inferred from corridor proximity. Establishing a common point of power failure would require the sites’ actual supply and backup arrangements.

The former defense-gap circles, site-hardening classifications, severity equation and future-risk predictions lacked source support and have been withdrawn. The four cases retain their authored disruption assumptions for inspection. The former interception ratios, damage ratings, exact restoration times and site-hardening labels in the attack history lacked consistent source support and have also been withdrawn.

Each incident account links to its Aramco, GCC or Saudi Ministry of Energy source. The grid inventory cites Saudi Electricity Company reports and includes analyst-geocoded substation points.

Read against current conditions on 18 July 2026, the last reading on file for this analysis. The next review was due 16 Oct 2026, on a 90-day cadence. The newest input comes from the AWS announcement published in August 2026, which gives a planned December 2026 launch for its first Saudi region. These are authored disruption assumptions, separate from the supply-chain cascade engine. Review state for every scenario is on the Scenarios page.

Saudi Grid

Pairs

Grid

History

Cases

Related pages

Sources

CSV

JSON

JSON with provenance