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Checked 2026-10-04 · unchanged since 2026-08-21RSS

Export Controls

Trade Impact

Export controls on AI chips and computing infrastructure, with designation records and semiconductor trade data.

Chip trade by corridor, before and after each export-control action

Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023

  1. Korea → China · exports−$8.16B (−19.8%)
  2. China IC imports from US−$6.64B (−46.1%)
  3. Japan → China · exports−$0.52B (−7.4%)
  4. Germany → China · exports−$0.15B (−9.4%)
  5. Netherlands → China · exports+$0.31B (+82.1%)
  6. Taiwan → China · exports+$1.77B (+3.9%)

Classification 1 reduced 0 redirected 0 expanded 1 absorbing 4 ambiguous 0 not measurable

Advanced Computing Update — TPP Metric · · 2021–22 avg → 2024

  1. China IC imports from US−$2.35B (−17.6%)
  2. Japan → China (equipment restricted) · exports−$1.29B (−17.1%)
  3. Netherlands → China (ASML restricted) · exports−$0.19B (−32.0%)

Classification 1 reduced 1 redirected 0 expanded 0 absorbing 1 ambiguous 0 not measurable

9

Corridors drawn across the 2 US actions with a featured corridor set, of the 6 inside the 2012–2023 bilateral comparison window; 24 US actions are recorded in all.

1

Classified redirected: the corridor fell while the reporter’s total held. The rest: 2 reduced, 0 expanded, 1 absorbing, 5 ambiguous, 0 not measurable

447,429

Integrated-circuit records these corridors are drawn from: the rows under HS 8542, out of the 451,069 the bilateral customs table holds across all its HS classes.

Actions with no corridor chart

Of the 6 US actions inside the 2012–2023 bilateral comparison window, 4 have no featured corridor set. A further 18 US actions fall outside that window: a corridor verdict needs a full post-event calendar year, and the customs rows past 2023 are partial. Those 18 are on the regimes view and stay selectable in the action selector below.

Huawei Entity List Designation (); Huawei Foreign Direct Product Rule (); SMIC Entity List Designation (); CHIPS and Science Act ().

Annualized change in bilateral integrated-circuit trade across each featured corridor, post-window minus pre-window. Each panel names its own two windows, and all panels share one linear dollar scale with zero at the vertical rule.

Fill encodes the verdict: reduced solid, redirected amber, expanded forest green, absorbing half-tone (corridor up while the reporter’s total fell), ambiguous hatched, not measurable outline only. A parenthetical in a corridor name says which goods the action restricted. The series is HS 8542; semiconductor manufacturing equipment (HS 8486) trades outside it.

The drawn changes run from $8.16B down to $0.15B, a 56-fold range computed before rounding.

A fall in chip trade with one partner may accompany a wider contraction or increased trade with other partners. The corridor classifications compare these changes with total imports or exports for the reporting country. Rerouting and attribution to one restriction are outside them: several actions can share a comparison window, and trade also moves with the semiconductor cycle.

Trade flows here are measured by corridor and country over HS 8542, decomposed by BIS action, with no per-entity or per-model series. A designation like IEIT Systems A has a trade series only through the corridors its country appears in. The selection carries through to Overview (chip × country matrix) and Diversion, where it resolves to specific rows.

The sections below, down to the seasonal counterfactual, show the chosen action; the corridor charts above do not change with it.

China IC import basket, as UN Comtrade reports it · Advanced Computing Export Controls ·

Other Asia, nes (Comtrade’s Taiwan label): $137B/yr pre (36.4%) → $133B post (39.5%)Korea: $75.0B/yr pre (19.9%) → $62.0B post (18.4%)China (self-reported (re-imports)): $46.9B/yr pre (12.4%) → $44.2B post (13.1%)Malaysia: $31.2B/yr pre (8.3%) → $21.9B post (6.5%)Vietnam: $19.4B/yr pre (5.2%) → $15.1B post (4.5%)Japan: $18.8B/yr pre (5.0%) → $20.0B post (5.9%)United States: $14.4B/yr pre (3.8%) → $7.8B post (2.3%)Philippines: $7.5B/yr pre (2.0%) → $6.8B post (2.0%)Ireland: $7.1B/yr pre (1.9%) → $4.9B post (1.5%)All other partners: $19.6B/yr pre (5.2%) → $21.4B post (6.3%)$377B/yr · 2020–21 avg$337B · 2023United States $14.4B/yr → $7.8B · 3.8% → 2.3% of the basket
3.8% → 2.3%

The United States’ direct share of China’s IC import basket, pre-window against post-window ($14.4B/yr → $7.8B), from a share that was already small before the restriction.

−10.5%

Change in China’s total imports ($377B/yr → $337B), used to classify its import corridors over the same period.

The restricted buyer’s IC import basket (HS 8542) by partner, pre-window against post-window, area-true on one dollar scale shared by every column; ribbons show each partner’s share across the window, and the amber strand is the United States.

Partner blocks keep the labels the customs authorities publish: UN Comtrade files China’s imports from Taiwan under the partner label “Other Asia, nes” (Taiwan's own customs report $47.2B of IC exports to China in 2023, the mirror of that block), and China’s series reports China itself as a partner, its own customs re-imports.

A block shorter than 4.4% of the column gets no printed tag.

Restricted sellers' export destinations

Korea IC exports by destination, as UN Comtrade reports them · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023

  1. China · restricted destination−$8.16B
  2. Hong Kong−$4.86B
  3. Philippines−$1.64B
  4. United States−$0.59B
  5. Vietnam+$0.21B
  6. Malaysia+$0.54B
  7. India+$0.75B
  8. Other Asia, nes+$0.99B
  9. All other partners · unnamed tail+$1.20B
  10. Singapore+$1.46B

This basket $95.6B/yr → $85.5B, −$10.1B; the bars sum to it restricted destination −$8.16B 4.1% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail

Japan IC exports by destination, as UN Comtrade reports them · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023

  1. Other Asia, nes−$1.50B
  2. China · restricted destination−$0.52B
  3. Singapore−$0.28B
  4. Hong Kong+$14M
  5. United States+$35M
  6. All other partners · unnamed tail+$62M
  7. Malaysia+$0.12B
  8. Thailand+$0.20B
  9. Vietnam+$0.92B
  10. Korea+$0.97B

This basket $28.2B/yr → $28.2B, +$19M; the bars sum to it restricted destination −$0.52B 5.9% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail

Germany IC exports by destination, as UN Comtrade reports them · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023

  1. Malaysia−$0.25B
  2. China · restricted destination−$0.15B
  3. Portugal+$0.27B
  4. Czechia+$0.27B
  5. France+$0.34B
  6. Romania+$0.62B
  7. Hungary+$0.72B
  8. Other Asia, nes+$1.03B
  9. Netherlands+$1.55B
  10. All other partners · unnamed tail+$3.00B

This basket $13.9B/yr → $21.3B, +$7.39B; the bars sum to it restricted destination −$0.15B 42.9% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail

Netherlands IC exports by destination, as UN Comtrade reports them · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023

  1. Poland−$2.11B
  2. All other partners · unnamed tail−$1.79B
  3. Czechia−$1.67B
  4. Germany−$0.82B
  5. United Kingdom−$0.51B
  6. Ireland−$0.51B
  7. Hungary−$0.50B
  8. Russia−$0.35B
  9. United States+$0.13B
  10. China · restricted destination+$0.31B

This basket $12.2B/yr → $4.33B, −$7.82B; the bars sum to it restricted destination +$0.31B 29.0% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail

Taiwan IC exports by destination, as Taiwan Customs reports them · Advanced Computing Export Controls · · 2020–21 avg → 2023

  1. Philippines−$0.21B
  2. Thailand+$0.87B
  3. Korea+$1.25B
  4. United States+$1.67B
  5. China · restricted destination+$1.77B
  6. Malaysia+$3.16B
  7. Hong Kong+$4.28B
  8. Singapore+$4.48B
  9. Japan+$5.04B
  10. All other partners · unnamed tail+$5.36B

This basket $138.8B/yr → $166.5B, +$27.7B; the bars sum to it restricted destination +$1.77B 4.0% of the pre-window sits in the unnamed tail

−$6.75B

Change in the 5 drawn sellers’ exports to the destination their featured corridor restricts, summed across the baskets above

+$5.36B

The largest single arrival across the baskets above is unnamed: Taiwan exports to every destination outside its named nine, rolled into one tail.

$9.62B

Growth landing in the unnamed tails: destinations outside each basket’s named nine.

For each reporter whose featured corridor the action restricts, the change in its annualized IC exports to every destination in its basket, post-window minus pre-window, on one linear dollar scale shared by every basket of every action. That scale is this plate’s own, so heights here and in the import basket above are not comparable.

Amber is the destination the action restricts, and the faint bar is the unnamed tail; within a basket the bars sum exactly to the printed total change. The drawn changes run from $8.16B down to $14M, a 578-fold range computed before rounding.

Each basket names its nine largest destinations by pre-window value and rolls the rest into one tail, so a destination that was small before the action and large after it arrives only as that tail growing, with no name on it. Each basket prints the share of its pre-window sitting in that tail.

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BIS licensing decisions, CY2017–CY2022

Data-vintage gap · BIS license actions

BIS license-action coverage, CY2017–CY2022

The BIS licensing data behind the friction figures ends at CY2022. Bilateral trade flows (UN Comtrade, CEPII BACI, Taiwan Customs, China GACC, Japan e-Stat) run through 2026 and cover the later years here: a trade flow records what crossed a border under a customs code, and a BIS licence action records what was approved, denied or returned without action.

Data vintage

CY2017–CY2022

2,587 rows × 33 jurisdictions · BIS OTE Annual Country Licensing & Trade Analysis

bis.gov · OTE ↗
Independent assessment

September 2025

CRS reported in September 2025 that BIS had not issued its annual public reports on China trade since 2022.

CRS R48642 (Sep 2025) ↗
First reporting date (passed)

2026-08-19

The law requires an annual report to congressional committees, subject to available appropriations, covering Entity List or Military End User List entities in Country Group D:5. Individual application and end-use-check details are exempt from public disclosure; aggregate statistics are excepted from that exemption.

Public Law 119–34, §2 ↗
CY2023+ trade-flow sources

Comtrade · BACI · Customs

UN Comtrade and CEPII BACI through 2024, US Census for 2022 to 2024, and Taiwan, China and Japan customs into 2026: HS 8542 integrated circuits, as declared at customs.

See the per-question crosswalk for the post-CY2022 window. Coverage dates update when new licensing records enter this dataset.

BIS licensing decisions by country

License applications approved, denied or returned without action over CY2017–CY2022. The friction rate is the share denied or returned, with all three outcomes in the denominator. These historical country totals do not establish the licensing requirements for a particular transaction. 2,587 records across 33 jurisdictions.

Order
Denial + RWA 15% or higher · 23.9% friction

China (CHN)

At least 15% of the recorded applications were denied or returned without action.

Approved24,992
Denied1,890
Returned (RWA)5,964
Top approved ECCNs (most-recent year published) · CY2022
  1. EAR99Items subject to the EAR that are not elsewhere specified in this CCL762(52.9%)
  2. 2B350Chemical manufacturing facilities and equipment, except valves control420(20.8%)
  3. 3E002“Technology” according to the General Technology Note other than that379(78.0%)
  4. 3E001“Technology” according to the General Technology Note for the “develop362(64.0%)
  5. 5E001“Technology” as follows (see List of Items Controlled).344(77.3%)
  6. 2B352Equipment Capable of Use in Handling Biological Materials, as Follows230(41.6%)
  7. 3A233Mass spectrometers, capable of measuring ions of 230 atomic mass units216(53.9%)
  8. 3B991Equipment not controlled by 3B001 for the manufacture of electronic “p185(97.4%)
  9. 3A001Electronic items as follows (see List of Items Controlled).167(13.0%)
  10. 2B230All types of “pressure transducers” capable of measuring absolute pres147(42.0%)
Top denied ECCNs (current-year only per BIS publication) · CY2022
  1. EAR99Items subject to the EAR that are not elsewhere specified in this CCL155(60.8%)
  2. 3B991Equipment not controlled by 3B001 for the manufacture of electronic “p46(100.0%)
  3. 5A992Equipment not controlled by 5A002 (see List of Items Controlled).32(68.1%)
  4. 3A999Specific Processing Equipment, n.e.s., as Follows (See List of Items C20(76.9%)
  5. 9E991“Technology”, for the “development”, “production” or “use” of equipmen19(51.4%)
  6. 2B999Specific Processing Equipment, n.e.s., as Follows (See List of Items C18(54.5%)
  7. 5A991Telecommunication equipment, not controlled by 5A001 (see List of Item15(68.2%)
  8. 3B001Equipment for the manufacturing of semiconductor devices or materials,14(93.3%)
  9. 5D992“Information Security” “software” not controlled by 5D002 as follows (13(46.4%)

Source: BIS Office of Technology Evaluation, annual country licensing reports. Classification lists include up to ten ECCNs per outcome in the latest available year; they need not sum to the country totals across CY2017–CY2022.