Abqaiq 2.0: Saudi Grid & Compute Co-Location

Scenario · Saudi grid co-location

Electrical grid dependency mapping. Pairs sovereign compute capacity against legacy energy infrastructure vulnerabilities; localized power availability modeled after a precision strike on shared grid nodes.

Saudi Arabia's AI buildout draws power from the same Eastern Province grid the 2019 Abqaiq drone attack took offline. The exposure here is collateral: compute next to petroleum, on a grid that is already a military objective.

Infrastructure Co-Location Risk

8 data centers, 7 petroleum facilities, 12 co-location pairs. Indirect disruption model: grid co-location with targeted petroleum infrastructure. Active: Abqaiq 2019 ReplaySaudi data centers share power grid infrastructure with the world's most targeted petroleum facilities. The 2019 Abqaiq attack (0% intercept rate, 18 drones, no interceptions) is the proof case. Active: Abqaiq 2019 Replay

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Saudi data centers in the Eastern Province share grid infrastructure with the world's most-targeted petroleum facilities. The September 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attack achieved 0% intercept across 18 drones, removing 5.7 mb/d of crude processing capacity for two weeks; co-located data centers would lose power as collaterally as the refineries did. 12DC–petroleum pairs sit within grid-coupling distance.

Methodology →SEC annual report · Aramco 2024 · CSIS / UN Panel of Experts S/2020/326 · IISS March 2026

Active scenarioAbqaiq 2019 Replay

Co-Location AnalysisEach Saudi DC paired with the nearest petroleum facility on the same grid zone, with shared-substation flag and exposure rationale.12 DC–petroleum pairs

Grid & SubstationsEastern / Central / Western 380 kV zones, named substations, and which facilities draw from each — the operational basis of co-location risk.3 zones · 8 substations

Attack HistoryStructured ledger of 2019–2022 Aramco strikes — projectile counts, intercept rates, damage class, restoration days. The empirical floor.6 events

Attack Scenario DetailsReference cards for each modeled attack — precedent, payload, primary targets, collateral DCs, expected outage duration.4 scenarios

MethodologyIndirect-disruption model (grid → DC), severity formula, air-defense gap analysis, and source authority tiering for SEC + Aramco data.