Methodology
The Tracker assembles six substrate files into one auditable view of a diversion thesis. Cascade edges come from corporate-filing primary sources (Singapore Bizfile UEN-traceable, Malaysian SSM, Hong Kong corporate register, FactSet entity trees), trade-record secondary sources (Tradesparq aggregations cited through Culper Research), and direct shipment records (single June 2024 Aivres → Speedmatrix shipment reported by the New York Times). Each evidence row carries an authority_tier — Tier 1 (primary disclosure), Tier 2 (research database / derived metric), Tier 3 (analyst report / press), Tier 4 (Scrutica-inferred). The 8 disclosure anomalies are formalized as rows in organization_data_quality_flags via migration 20260605000000 and surface here in feature-page-ready form.
BGP corroboration runs against PeeringDB's public peering tables — the same data ISPs use to coordinate IX interconnection. A direct peering between a Culper-named facility and a Chinese-hyperscaler ASN (Huawei Cloud Global AS136907, Alibaba Aliyun AS45102, China Mobile International AS58453, ByteDance / TikTok AS396986, China Unicom Global AS10099) at a public IX is forensic evidence of network presence that does NOT depend on Tradesparq or analyst narrative. Calibrated nulls (YTL Green DC, Bridge DC, Singapore Equinix flagships) are surfaced explicitly because hyperscale DCs use private cross-connect topology invisible to PeeringDB — absence is neither corroboration nor refutation.
The magnitude studio (Section 1) is built on Scrutica's FLOP Estimation Engine: per-card BF16 PFLOPS from Nvidia spec sheets (Tier 1) multiplied by a chip mix and ASP multiplier (Tier 2 derived metrics), with a model-FLOPs-utilization slider (25–50% band) and a Tier-1-only counterfactual toggle that strips the Tradesparq trade-volume input. Output scales linearly with the trade-volume input; the framework is most useful for understanding the magnitude band, not for asserting point-precision capacity. See the Compute Visibility Index for the parent framework on attributing capacity to specific jurisdictions, and Export Controls for the BIS Entity List designation context behind the Inspur Group rebrand narrative.
How this framework sits in the literature · 5 papers
Positioning paragraphs describe how each paper anchors a specific facet of the Tracker’s framing — compute as governance instrument, threat-model parallels, firm-level chokepoint analysis, the innovation-vs-control tension, and the firmware-enforcement complement. BibTeX entries inline for direct citation in working papers and policy briefs.
Sastry, G., Heim, L., Belfield, H., Anderljung, M., Brundage, M., et al. (19 authors) · 2024
Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence
arXiv preprint
Articulates compute as a governance instrument — visible, excludable, quantifiable — and argues that compute-based regulation can complement model-, output-, and capability-based governance. The Diversion Pipeline Tracker operationalizes the visibility leg of that argument at the case-evidence layer: when the underlying compute *should* be governable but the supply-chain topology defeats the visibility mechanism, what does the empirical surface look like?
BibTeX
@misc{sastry2024computing,
author = {Sastry, Girish and Heim, Lennart and Belfield, Haydn and Anderljung, Markus and Brundage, Miles and Hazell, Julian and O'Keefe, Cullen and Hadfield, Gillian K. and Ngo, Richard and Pilz, Konstantin and Gor, George and Bluemke, Emma and Shoker, Sarah and Egan, Janet and Trager, Robert F. and Avin, Shahar and Weller, Adrian and Bengio, Yoshua and Coyle, Diane},
title = {Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence},
year = {2024},
eprint = {2402.08797},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
primaryClass = {cs.CY},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.08797},
}
Nevo, S., Lahav, D., Karpur, A., Bar-On, Y., Bradley, H.A., Alstott, J. · 2024
Securing AI Model Weights: Preventing Theft and Misuse of Frontier Models
RAND Research Report RR-A2849-1
A threat-model and benchmark-playbook for protecting model weights against state-actor and commercial-proxy adversaries. The Tracker is the compute-side analogue: same adversary topology, different attack surface — export-controlled hardware in the diffusion phase rather than trained weights at rest. Where Nevo et al. ask what “securing the weights” looks like, the Tracker asks what failure to secure the silicon looks like when the chain of custody routes through opaque foreign-listed parents and SEA intermediaries.
BibTeX
@techreport{nevo2024securing,
author = {Nevo, Sella and Lahav, Dan and Karpur, Ajay and Bar-On, Yogev and Bradley, Henry Alexander and Alstott, Jeff},
title = {Securing AI Model Weights: Preventing Theft and Misuse of Frontier Models},
year = {2024},
number = {RR-A2849-1},
institution = {RAND Corporation},
address = {Santa Monica, CA},
doi = {10.7249/RRA2849-1},
url = {https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2849-1.html},
}
Kardon, I.B. and McBride, M. · 2025
Rocks vs. Chips
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace · Paper
Frames the strategic chokepoint analysis of physical commodity supply chains versus semiconductor supply chains: where physical-commodity chokepoints concentrate at geography, semiconductor chokepoints concentrate at *firm* — and firms have governance affordances commodities do not. The Tracker’s edge encoding (which firm is BIS-designated, which is uplifted via 50%-subsidiary, which sits in a jurisdiction with API-accessible UBO disclosure) renders the firm-level chokepoint surface Kardon and McBride argue is the durable lever.
BibTeX
@techreport{kardon2025rocks,
author = {Kardon, Isaac B. and McBride, Milo},
title = {Rocks vs. Chips},
year = {2025},
institution = {Carnegie Endowment for International Peace},
type = {Paper},
month = {February},
url = {https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/02/rocks-vs-chips},
}
Villasenor, J. · 2024
The tension between AI export control and U.S. AI innovation
Brookings Commentary
Articulates the principal-policy tension: aggressive export controls protect strategic advantage in the short term but may degrade the US innovation base (and ally-coordination tolerance) over the long term. The Tracker contributes the empirical surface for adjudicating this tension at the case-evidence level — if specific export-control regimes are defeated by specific topologies of corporate filings, the tension argument needs to grapple with the failure mode, not just the design intent.
BibTeX
@misc{villasenor2024tension,
author = {Villasenor, John},
title = {The tension between AI export control and U.S. AI innovation},
year = {2024},
howpublished = {Brookings Commentary},
month = {September},
url = {https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-tension-between-ai-export-control-and-u-s-ai-innovation/},
}
Petrie, J. · 2024
Near-Term Enforcement of AI Chip Export Controls Using A Firmware-Based Design for Offline Licensing
arXiv preprint
Proposes a firmware-level licensing mechanism that would make chip-by-chip export control enforceable without continuous network reachability. The Tracker maps the *failure mode* the Petrie proposal addresses: when paper export controls (entity designation, geographic-revenue disclosure, 50%-subsidiary uplift) are circumvented by corporate-topology engineering, the firmware-side enforcement gap becomes the binding constraint. The two papers describe complementary halves of the same problem.
BibTeX
@misc{petrie2024firmware,
author = {Petrie, James},
title = {Near-Term Enforcement of AI Chip Export Controls Using A Firmware-Based Design for Offline Licensing},
year = {2024},
eprint = {2404.18308},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
primaryClass = {cs.CR},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.18308},
}