Cascade

2 corrections · latest May 19, 2026Fresh10d

If a node, region, or supply-chain layer fails, what stops — where, and how fast. A quantitative propagation model that walks the supplier–customer graph one edge at a time, weighting each hop by trade-flow share, editorial replaceability, and the stock-price correlation between coupled firms. The Engine runs any disruption you build; Scenarios pins it to named geopolitical stress cases, each carrying its own dated threat analysis.

Cascade

2 corrections · latest May 19, 2026Fresh10d

Abqaiq 2.0: Saudi Grid & Compute Co-Location

Scenario · Saudi grid co-location

Analysis · reviewed 2026 Q1Last reviewed 2026-07-18

Reviewed against major regional developments; threat-model parameters updated as events warrant.

Saudi Arabia's AI buildout draws power from the same Eastern Province grid the 2019 Abqaiq drone attack took offline. The exposure here is collateral: compute next to petroleum, on a grid that is already a military objective.

Infrastructure Co-Location Risk

8 data centers, 7 petroleum facilities, 12 co-location pairs. Indirect disruption model: grid co-location with targeted petroleum infrastructure. Active: Abqaiq 2019 ReplaySaudi data centers share power grid infrastructure with the world's most targeted petroleum facilities. The 2019 Abqaiq attack (0% intercept rate, 18 drones, no interceptions) is the proof case. Active: Abqaiq 2019 Replay

Choose attack scenario

Saudi data centers in the Eastern Province share grid infrastructure with the world's most-targeted petroleum facilities. The September 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attack achieved 0% intercept across 18 drones, removing 5.7 mb/d of crude processing capacity for two weeks; co-located data centers would lose power as collaterally as the refineries did. 12DC–petroleum pairs sit within grid-coupling distance.

Methodology →SEC annual report · Aramco 2024 · CSIS / UN Panel of Experts S/2020/326 · IISS March 2026

Active scenarioAbqaiq 2019 Replay

Co-Location AnalysisEach Saudi DC paired with the nearest petroleum facility on the same grid zone, with shared-substation flag and exposure rationale.12 DC–petroleum pairs

Grid & SubstationsEastern / Central / Western 380 kV zones, named substations, and which facilities draw from each — the operational basis of co-location risk.3 zones · 8 substations

Attack HistoryStructured ledger of 2019–2022 Aramco strikes — projectile counts, intercept rates, damage class, restoration days. The empirical floor.6 events

Attack Scenario DetailsReference cards for each modeled attack — precedent, payload, primary targets, collateral DCs, expected outage duration.4 scenarios

MethodologyIndirect-disruption model (grid → DC), severity formula, air-defense gap analysis, and source authority tiering for SEC + Aramco data.

Rerun this disruption in the engine

A caveat, not an equivalent: the cascade engine propagates through supplier–customer edges, and this scenario’s mechanism is grid co-location— data centers going dark because they share an electrical grid with a struck petroleum facility, which is a geographic adjacency the supply-chain graph does not encode. Opening the engine runs the differentquestion of a direct supply-chain strike on the co-located operator (Alphabet, whose Dammam region anchors the analysis above); it does not reproduce the grid-sharing exposure that is this page’s actual subject. The grid model here stands on its own.