Co-Location Risk Model
The disruption pathway here is INDIRECT: attacks on petroleum infrastructure cause grid failures that collaterally de-power data centers on the same grid segment. No adversary needs to target a data center when the petroleum facility next to it on the same grid is already a military objective.
| Data Center | Petroleum Facility | Distance | Same Grid | Exposure Analysis |
|---|
| Google Cloud Dammam | Ras Tanura Refinery & Terminal | 24 km | ● | Direct grid interdependency: petroleum facility disruption causes DC power loss on shared grid segment |
| Aramco Digital DC (Dhahran) | Ras Tanura Refinery & Terminal | 39 km | ● | Direct grid interdependency: petroleum facility disruption causes DC power loss on shared grid segment |
| Aramco Digital DC (Dhahran) | Abqaiq Processing Facility | 60 km | ● | Shared grid zone; extended outage at petroleum facility may affect DC power |
| Google Cloud Dammam | Abqaiq Processing Facility | 69 km | ● | Shared grid zone; extended outage at petroleum facility may affect DC power |
| Google Cloud Dammam | Jubail Industrial Complex (SATORP) | 78 km | ● | Shared grid zone; extended outage at petroleum facility may affect DC power |
| Google Cloud Dammam | Jubail Desalination Plant | 81 km | ● | Shared grid zone; extended outage at petroleum facility may affect DC power |
| Aramco Digital DC (Dhahran) | Jubail Industrial Complex (SATORP) | 93 km | ● | Shared grid zone; extended outage at petroleum facility may affect DC power |
| Aramco Digital DC (Dhahran) | Jubail Desalination Plant | 96 km | ● | Shared grid zone; extended outage at petroleum facility may affect DC power |
| AWS Saudi Arabia (Riyadh) | Khurais Oil Field | 150 km | — | Geographic proximity but limited grid interdependency |
| DataVolt Hyperscale (Riyadh) | Khurais Oil Field | 150 km | — | Geographic proximity but limited grid interdependency |
| Oracle Cloud Riyadh | Khurais Oil Field | 154 km | — | Geographic proximity but limited grid interdependency |
| STC Data Center (Riyadh) | Khurais Oil Field | 155 km | — | Geographic proximity but limited grid interdependency |
Air Defense Gaps (Exploited in Practice)
Western Approach Blind Spot (Abqaiq)EXPLOITED
All six Patriot battalions defending Abqaiq were oriented to intercept threats from Yemen (south) and Iran (east/northeast). The September 2019 attack approached from the WEST/NORTHWEST, a direction with no radar coverage. Patriot AN/MPQ-65 radar has 120° sector coverage; it cannot see targets behind it.
September 14, 2019 Abqaiq-Khurais attack. 18 drones + 7 cruise missiles. 0% intercept rate. Attack vectors flew low-altitude from Iraq/Kuwait direction.
CSIS "The Attack on Saudi Arabia" (Nov 2019); UN Panel of Experts S/2020/326; CNBC Abqaiq analysis · Tier 2
Low-Altitude Drone EnvelopeEXPLOITED
Patriot PAC-3 engages targets at 15,000m+ altitude. Iranian-made delta-wing loitering munitions (Shahed-131 family) fly at 60-200m altitude, well below the Patriot radar horizon. The 2019 attack demonstrated this gap. THAAD (deployed to Saudi Arabia July 2025) engages at even higher altitudes and provides zero low-altitude coverage. Only point-defense systems (Shahine, Oerlikon Skyshield) cover this envelope, and Saudi inventory is insufficient for area defense.
Houthi drone campaign 2019-present. Delta-wing loitering munitions (Shahed-131 predecessors in 2019; Shahed-136 from 2022 onward) consistently evade Patriot detection. The 2019 Abqaiq drones flew low enough to avoid all radar acquisition.
CSIS Missile Defense Project; IISS "Defending the Skies of the Arab Gulf States" (March 2026) · Tier 2
Saturation Capacity LimitEXPLOITED
Each Patriot battery can engage 1-2 simultaneous targets. Saudi Arabia operates 24 Patriot batteries (largest Gulf fleet). A coordinated salvo of 50+ drones/missiles (as demonstrated in 2019 with 25 projectiles, escalating to 100+ in Houthi 2023-2024 attacks) can overwhelm available interceptors. Economic asymmetry: each Patriot interceptor costs $3-4M; each Shahed-series drone costs ~$20K.
Progressive salvo escalation: 25 projectiles (2019), 50+ (2021 attacks), 100+ (2024 Red Sea campaign). Interceptor stockpile depletion is a real constraint.
CSIS; CRS R45891 "Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations" · Tier 2