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# Access Routes

Exporting a controlled AI chip to a company headquartered in China needs a US licence, wherever the buyer is.

Renting that company time on the same chip in a data centre abroad needs one where the provider knows the AI model will be used for weapons of mass destruction or military intelligence; BIS says the chip also needs one where such a company is known to use more than half the data centre’s compute. A rule Commerce released on 16 Nov 2026 requires a licence, once it is published in the Federal Register, for chips the exporter knows are bound for a data centre that gives or will give such companies access to more than 12,000,000 aggregate TPP, the sum of each chip’s total processing performance.

-   a case that has reached a guilty plea or a judgment; pale: alleged
-   an official body’s document
-   a press report or a published allegation; pale: one that repeats another outlet’s report
-   a company’s own statement
-   a dashed line: the chip stays abroad; its owner or its user is in China

licence

A controlled AI chip leaves its seller

Sold into China under the rules

a buyer in China

Needs a licence; case by case below a performance line.

15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A), (b)(10)(iii)(A)(1); 91 FR 1684, 15 Jan 2026

2 company statements

Moved into China against the rules

a buyer in China

Needs a licence.

15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)

9 cases (4 have reached a guilty plea or a judgment); 2 official statements, 4 press reports, 1 published allegation

Bought abroad by a company headquartered in China

a data centre abroad owned by a company headquartered in China

Needs a licence wherever the buyer is, since 17 Nov 2023.

15 CFR 744.23(a)(3)(i)(A), 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A); 88 FR 73458, 25 Oct 2023; BIS guidance, 31 May 2026

2 official statements, 1 press report

relayed report, Jun 2026

its parent

[Megaspeed](https://scrutica.com/companies/org-megaspeed): public sources do not settle which route.

Latest step 13 Nov 2026 [Press report, The Star (Malaysia), from BERNAMA. Malaysia is checking whether the chips were re-exported.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-megaspeed-miti-check-2026-11)

Rented abroad from another company’s data centre

another company’s data centre abroad

Today. Needs a licence where the provider knows of a weapons-of-mass-destruction or military-intelligence use; BIS says the chips also need one where a company headquartered in China is known to use more than half the data centre’s compute. A bill has passed the House.

On publication. Also needs one for chips the exporter knows are bound for a data centre that gives or will give companies headquartered in China access to more than 12,000,000 aggregate TPP, unless the access is only for a commercial recommender system and the exporter reports it to BIS; a data centre already supplying them a “significant volume” of compute must obtain one within 90 days to continue.

15 CFR 734.13(a)(1); BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025; H.R. 2683, 12 Jan 2026; 15 CFR 744.24 (released 16 Nov 2026)

3 official statements, 4 press reports

relayed reports, Nov 2025, Dec 2025 and Mar 2026

A lawful rental does not produce a case.

a company headquartered in China

outside China

in China

China’s border

A solid line follows the chip. Two routes take it across China’s border and two leave it abroad.

## The four routes, year by year

The chip is in China

Sold into China under the rules

[Oct 2022 needs a licence](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/regimes#panel-regime-us-oct-2022)[Apr 2025 H20 needs a licence](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-us-usg-h20-licence-requirement-2025-04)[Jan 2026 reviewed case by case](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/regimes#panel-regime-us-jan-2026)[](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-us-usg-h200-licences-2026)[](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-us-usg-h200-licences-2026)

Moved into China against the rules

[Oct 2022 needs a licence](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/regimes#panel-regime-us-oct-2022)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-sdtx-4-25-cr-00510)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-cdca-2-25-cr-00703)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-sdny-1-26-cr-00100)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-ndga-1-26-cr-00256)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#sg-spf-2025-02-27-server-fraud)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-mdfl-8-25-cr-00530)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-sdtx-4-25-cr-00687)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#tw-klc-2026-08-24-b300-servers)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-cdca-2-26-cr-00618)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-customs-server-investigation-2025-02)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-kr-kcs-816-ai-servers-2026-03)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-singapore-servers-inquiry-2025-03)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-press-joongang-2025-04-09)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#culper-report)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-klia-72-ai-servers-2026-06)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-klia-30-ai-servers-2026-10)

China’s border

[Megaspeed](https://scrutica.com/companies/org-megaspeed): public sources do not settle which route.

[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-megaspeed-spf-reply-2026-10)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-megaspeed-spf-reply-2026-10)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-megaspeed-miti-check-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-megaspeed-spf-reply-2026-10)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-megaspeed-spf-reply-2026-10)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-megaspeed-miti-check-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-megaspeed-spf-reply-2026-10)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-megaspeed-spf-reply-2026-10)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-megaspeed-spf-reply-2026-10)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-megaspeed-miti-check-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-megaspeed-spf-reply-2026-10)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-megaspeed-spf-reply-2026-10)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-megaspeed-spf-reply-2026-10)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-megaspeed-spf-reply-2026-10)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-megaspeed-miti-check-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-megaspeed-miti-check-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)[](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-megaspeed-commerce-inquiry-2026-11)

Latest step 13 Nov 2026 [Press report, The Star (Malaysia), from BERNAMA. Malaysia is checking whether the chips were re-exported.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-megaspeed-miti-check-2026-11)

The chip is in another country; its use reaches a company headquartered in China

Bought abroad by a company headquartered in China

[Nov 2023 needs a licence](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/regimes#panel-regime-us-oct-2023)[Nov 2026 rule released](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)[](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-us-bis-guidance-2026-05-31-hq-licence)[](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-us-bis-guidance-2026-05-31-hq-licence)[](https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2026/06/01/us-takes-step-to-halt-nvidia-ai-chip-shipments-to-chinese-firms-outside-china "Press report, 1 Jun 2026")

Rented abroad from another company’s data centre

[May 2025 BIS policy statement](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-us-bis-ai-training-policy-statement-2025-05-13)[Jan 2026 a bill has passed the House](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/regimes#panel-regime-us-remote-access-security-act-2026)[Nov 2026 rule released](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)[](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-my-miti-20250618-zero-tolerance-statement)[](https://x.com/mkratsios47/status/2079933645888880708 "Michael Kratsios, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, 22 Jul 2026")[](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-sg-mddi-20261006-ai-chip-export-controls-reply)[](https://www.tovima.com/wsj/chinese-ai-companies-dodge-u-s-chip-curbs-by-flying-suitcases-of-hard-drives-abroad/ "The Wall Street Journal, 13 Jun 2025")[](https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/artificial-intelligence/chinese-ai-startup-gets-access-to-2-300-banned-blackwell-gpus-by-exploiting-cloud-loophole-rents-compute-from-indonesian-firm-with-32-nvidia-gb200-server-racks "Press report, 14 Nov 2025")[](https://hwbusters.com/news/tencent-taps-nvidia-blackwell-through-japan/ "Press report, 28 Dec 2025")[](https://www.thestandard.com.hk/finance/article/326579/ "Press report, 13 Mar 2026")

## The rules, in their words

### Sold into China under the rules

Needs a licence worldwide, in the eCFR’s text of 23 Jul 2026

> “A license is required to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) items specified in ECCNs … 3A090.a; … 4A090.a; … to or within any destination worldwide.”

[15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A), 23 Jul 2026](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-742/section-742.6)

Reviewed case by case below a performance line, in the eCFR’s text of 23 Jul 2026

> “There is a case-by-case license review policy for license applications for exports of commodities with a TPP (as defined in Technical Note 2 to 3A090.a and 3A090.b) less than 21,000, and a 'total DRAM bandwidth' (as defined in the notes to paragraph (dd)(1) in supplement no. 2 to part 748) less than 6,500 GB/s, when destined to end-users located in China or Macau, provided the applicant provides the additional information described in supplement no. 2 to part 748 under paragraph (dd).”

[15 CFR 742.6(b)(10)(iii)(A)(1), 23 Jul 2026](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-742/section-742.6)

Otherwise presumed denied, in the eCFR’s text of 23 Jul 2026

> “All other applications for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) will be reviewed under a presumption of denial to or within Macau or destinations specified in Country Group D:5 or to an entity headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, either Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5.”

[15 CFR 742.6(b)(10)(iii)(A)(1), 23 Jul 2026](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-742/section-742.6)

Changed on 15 Jan 2026

> “The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is revising its license review policy for exports of certain semiconductors to China and Macau—changing it from a presumption of denial to a case-by-case review.”

[91 FR 1684, Summary, 15 Jan 2026](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/15/2026-00789/revision-to-license-review-policy-for-advanced-computing-commodities)

A licence condition on remote access

> “… the ultimate consignee will employ rigorous Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures to screen and prevent unauthorized remote access to unauthorized parties (e.g., prohibited part 744 parties);”

[91 FR 1684, section I (one item of a list the applicant must certify), 15 Jan 2026](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/15/2026-00789/revision-to-license-review-policy-for-advanced-computing-commodities)

The requirement as the rule revises it, by destination

> “A license is required for items specified in ECCNs 3A001.z; 3A090 (except for 3A090.c); 3D001 (for “software” for commodities controlled by 3A001.z, 3A090 (except for 3A090.c)); 3E001 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 3A001.z, 3A090 (except for 3A090.c)); 4A003.z; 4A004.z; 4A005.z; 4A090; 4D001 (for “software” for commodities controlled by 4A003.z, 4A004.z, and 4A005.z); 4D090 (for “software” for commodities controlled by 4A090); 4E001 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 4A090 or “software” specified by 4D001 (for 4A003.z, 4A004.z, and 4A005.z), 4D090 (for “software” for commodities controlled by 4A090)); 5A002.z; 5A004.z; 5A992.z; 5D002.z; 5D992.z; 5E002 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 5A002.z or 5A004.z or “software” specified by 5D002 (for 5A002.z or 5A004.z commodities)); or 5E992 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 5A992.z or “software” controlled by 5D992.z) for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) to or within the destinations specified under paragraphs (a)(6)(iii)(A)(1)-(2).”

[15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A) (released 16 Nov 2026), pp. 26-27](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

Destinations in Country Groups D:1, D:4 and D:5, which include China, and the United Arab Emirates

> “A destination in Country Groups D:1, D:4, or D:5 (excluding destinations also specified in Country Groups A:5 or A:6) or the United Arab Emirates, except that a license is not required when the ultimate consignee and all end users are approved entities in the United Arab Emirates listed in supplement no. 8 to part 740 and specified as approved to receive the items covered by this paragraph.”

[15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(2) (released 16 Nov 2026), p. 27](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

### Moved into China against the rules

Needs a licence worldwide, in the eCFR’s text of 23 Jul 2026

> “A license is required to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) items specified in ECCNs … 3A090.a; … 4A090.a; … to or within any destination worldwide.”

[15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A), 23 Jul 2026](https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-C/part-742/section-742.6)

Needed one from 7 Oct 2022

> “A license is required for items specified in ECCNs 3A090, 3B090, 4A090, 5A992 (that meet or exceed the performance parameters of ECCNs 3A090 or 4A090) and associated software and technology in 3D001 (for 3A090 or 3B090), 3E001 (for 3A090 or 3B090), 3B090, or 3D001 (for 3A090 or 3B090), 4D090, 4E001 (for 4A090 and 4D090), and 5D992 (that meet or exceed the performance parameters of ECCNs 3A090 or 4A090) being exported, reexported, or transferred (in-country) to or within the China.”

[87 FR 62186, § 742.6(a)(6)(i) as added (effective 7 Oct 2022), 13 Oct 2022](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/10/13/2022-21658/implementation-of-additional-export-controls-certain-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor)

The requirement as the rule revises it, by destination

> “A license is required for items specified in ECCNs 3A001.z; 3A090 (except for 3A090.c); 3D001 (for “software” for commodities controlled by 3A001.z, 3A090 (except for 3A090.c)); 3E001 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 3A001.z, 3A090 (except for 3A090.c)); 4A003.z; 4A004.z; 4A005.z; 4A090; 4D001 (for “software” for commodities controlled by 4A003.z, 4A004.z, and 4A005.z); 4D090 (for “software” for commodities controlled by 4A090); 4E001 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 4A090 or “software” specified by 4D001 (for 4A003.z, 4A004.z, and 4A005.z), 4D090 (for “software” for commodities controlled by 4A090)); 5A002.z; 5A004.z; 5A992.z; 5D002.z; 5D992.z; 5E002 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 5A002.z or 5A004.z or “software” specified by 5D002 (for 5A002.z or 5A004.z commodities)); or 5E992 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 5A992.z or “software” controlled by 5D992.z) for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) to or within the destinations specified under paragraphs (a)(6)(iii)(A)(1)-(2).”

[15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A) (released 16 Nov 2026), pp. 26-27](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

Destinations in Country Groups D:1, D:4 and D:5, which include China, and the United Arab Emirates

> “A destination in Country Groups D:1, D:4, or D:5 (excluding destinations also specified in Country Groups A:5 or A:6) or the United Arab Emirates, except that a license is not required when the ultimate consignee and all end users are approved entities in the United Arab Emirates listed in supplement no. 8 to part 740 and specified as approved to receive the items covered by this paragraph.”

[15 CFR 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(2) (released 16 Nov 2026), p. 27](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

### Bought abroad by a company headquartered in China

Needs a licence, wherever the buyer is

> “The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is issuing this guidance to clarify that a license is required to export advanced computing items to entities headquartered in Country Group D:5 (see supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 CFR parts 730-774)) or Macau or with an ultimate parent company headquartered in Country Group D:5 or Macau – even if the entities themselves are located outside Country Group D:5 or Macau.”

[BIS guidance of 31 May 2026, para. 1](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/bis-guidance-may-31-2026.pdf)

Since 17 Nov 2023

> “This license requirement was first introduced on November 17, 2023. It was implemented via an end-user control in § 744.23(a)(3) of the EAR and applied to all advanced computing items (e.g., those specified in Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) 3A090.a and .b, 4A090.a and .b, and related .z paragraph items).”

[BIS guidance of 31 May 2026, para. 2](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/bis-guidance-may-31-2026.pdf)

BIS’s reason for adding it

> “This additional end-use control is needed to ensure that the national security objectives of the October 7 IFR and this AC/S IFR are not undermined by Macau, PRC or other Country Group D:5 entities setting up cloud or data servers in other countries to allow these headquartered companies of concern to continue to train their AI models in ways that would be contrary to U.S. national security interests.”

[88 FR 73458, preamble on § 744.23(a)(3)(i), 25 Oct 2023](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/25/2023-23055/implementation-of-additional-export-controls-certain-advanced-computing-items-supercomputer-and)

Chips already installed could keep running until further notice, BIS said on 31 May 2026

> “Bona fide operators of data centers who are otherwise engaged in activities consistent with the EAR are not required to cease the ongoing use, storage, disposal, or servicing of advanced computing items because of this guidance, until further notice from BIS.”

[BIS guidance of 31 May 2026, para. 4](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/bis-guidance-may-31-2026.pdf)

The requirement as the rule revises it

> “Any item subject to the EAR and specified in ECCN 3A001.z; 3A090 (except for 3A090.c); 4A003.z; 4A004.z; 4A005.z; 4A090; 5A002.z; 5A004.z; 5A992.z, 5D002.z; 5D992.z destined to any destination other than those specified in Country Groups D:1, D:4, or D:5 (excluding any destination also specified in Country Groups A:5 or A:6) for an entity that is headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, either Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5 (e.g., a PRC-headquartered cloud or data server provider located outside of Country Groups D:1, D:4, or D:5 (excluding any destination also specified in Country Groups A:5 or A:6)).”

[15 CFR 744.23(a)(3)(i)(A) (released 16 Nov 2026), p. 32](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

BIS on keeping the requirement for companies headquartered in China

> “As a conforming change, this IFR makes revisions to the advanced computing items end-use control under § 744.23(a)(3) to ensure that a license will continue to be required for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of these advanced computing items when such items are destined for entities headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, Country Group D:5 or Macau.”

[RIN 0694-AK50, preamble, section III.B (released 16 Nov 2026), p. 12](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

### Rented abroad from another company’s data centre

Outside the rules, BIS advised in 2009

> “The service of providing computational capacity would not be subject to the EAR as the service provider is not shipping or transmitting any commodity, software, or technology to the user.”

[BIS Advisory Opinion, 13 Jan 2009, p. 2, answer (1)](https://www.bis.gov/media/1343)

May need one under the catch-all, BIS said in May 2025

> “The following activities may trigger a license requirement under the catch-all controls of part 744 of the EAR when there is “knowledge” (see inset below for further information about “knowledge” under the EAR) that the AI model will be used for a WMD or military-intelligence end use/user:”

[BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1](https://web.archive.org/web/20250513220441id_/https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/ai-policy-statement-training-ai-models-may-13-2025)

The catch-all reaches chips already in a data centre, BIS said in May 2025

> “Transfers (in-country), defined as a change in end use or end user, of advanced computing ICs and commodities subject to the EAR already in the possession of parties such as IaaS providers, if there is “knowledge” that the items will be used by the transferee to train AI models for or on behalf of parties headquartered in D:5 countries (including China) or Macau.”

[BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 1, second bullet](https://web.archive.org/web/20250513220441id_/https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/ai-policy-statement-training-ai-models-may-13-2025)

A listing does not need a violation

> “… foreign parties acting contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, including by training AI models that could support WMD or military-intelligence end uses for or on behalf of parties headquartered in Country Group D:5 (including China) or Macau, may be added to the Entity List, even where no violation of the EAR occurs.”

[BIS policy statement, 13 May 2025, p. 2](https://web.archive.org/web/20250513220441id_/https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/ai-policy-statement-training-ai-models-may-13-2025)

A bill that passed the House on 12 Jan 2026 would let Commerce control remote access

> “The term ‘remote access’ means access on a purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent basis to an item subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under this Act by a foreign person through a network connection, including the internet or a cloud computing service, from a location other than where the item is physically located if the Secretary determines that the use of the item could pose a serious risk to the national security or foreign policy of the United States.”

[H.R. 2683 (engrossed), sec. 2(1), new ECRA sec. 1742(15), 12 Jan 2026](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119hr2683eh/html/BILLS-119hr2683eh.htm)

The requirement, above 12,000,000 aggregate TPP

> “… without a license if you have “knowledge” at the time of the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) that the item is destined to a data center to or within any destination worldwide that is providing or will provide access to more than 12,000,000 “aggregate TPP” either at one data center or through ‘linked data centers’ to or for companies headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5 in supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR.”

[15 CFR 744.24(a)(1) (released 16 Nov 2026), p. 33](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

The exclusion for commercial recommender systems

> “The prohibitions under this section do not apply when the computing power access is only being provided for a ‘commercial recommender system’ and you submit the following information to https://www.bis.gov/ai/exclusionnotesubmission, which will be shared with the End User Review Committee.”

[15 CFR 744.24(b)(2) (released 16 Nov 2026), p. 35](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

The first sentence of the rule’s definition of a commercial recommender system

> “A commercial recommender system means a Super Intelligence (SI) tool exclusively designed and exclusively used to rank, filter, or suggest commercial products, services, or content to users based on user behavior, transaction history, or item attributes.”

[15 CFR 744.24(d)(1) (released 16 Nov 2026), p. 36](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

Data centres supplying such companies before publication

> “Any data center providing significant volume of compute power to companies headquartered, or with an ultimate parent headquartered, in Macau or Country Group D:5 prior to the publication date of this rule that wishes to continue providing these services must obtain a license with 90 days of the effective date of this IFR or face future export restrictions.”

[15 CFR 744.24(b)(3) (released 16 Nov 2026), p. 36](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

A red flag for the exporter

> “A foreign data center declining or being unable to provide information sufficient to verify compliance with this end use control shall be considered a red flag that presumptively provides you with “knowledge” unless you are able to resolve that red flag before proceeding with the transaction.”

[Note 3 to 15 CFR 744.24(a)(1) (released 16 Nov 2026), p. 34](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

Linked data centres

> “For purposes of this section, a ‘linked data center’ means a data center that uses networking infrastructure that links two or more separate data centers together, through digitally-linked or physically-linked infrastructure, that allows physical and virtual facilities to share resources, balance workloads, and replicate data as a unified whole. ‘Linked data center’ includes digitally-linked infrastructure, not just physically-linked infrastructure.”

[15 CFR 744.24(d)(2) (released 16 Nov 2026), p. 36](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

BIS’s reading of its 2023 control

> “This end-use control thus is not, and has never been limited only to exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) destined to such entities of concern as ultimate consignees or end users, but extends to exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) on behalf of these entities of concern, e.g., if an entity of concern was the purchaser in the transaction (directly or indirectly) or was the exclusive or primary (greater than 50 percent of total compute) remote end user of the data center computing capacity.”

[RIN 0694-AK50, preamble, section III.B (released 16 Nov 2026), p. 13](https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/rin-0694-ak50.pdf)

## Public sources, route by route

### Sold into China under the rules

A company’s own statement

-   NVIDIA Corporation, 25 Feb 2026: [“In August 2025, the USG granted licenses that would allow us to ship certain H20 products to certain China-based customers.”](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-us-usg-h200-licences-2026)
-   NVIDIA Corporation, 26 Aug 2026: [“The licenses require that the H200s go through an inspection process in the United States prior to any shipment to the customer.”](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-us-usg-h200-licences-2026)

### Moved into China against the rules

A case that has reached a guilty plea or a judgment

-   United States v. Hao Global LLC and Alan Hao Hsu, 5 Nov 2025: [Pleas accepted.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-sdtx-4-25-cr-00510)
-   United States v. Geng and Yang, 12 Jun 2026: [Judgment (1 of 3).](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-cdca-2-25-cr-00703)
-   United States v. Liaw, Chang and Sun, 8 Sep 2026: [Guilty plea (1 of 3).](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-sdny-1-26-cr-00100)
-   United States v. English; United States v. Kelly; United States v. Zheng, 9 Jul 2026: [Guilty plea (1 of 3).](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-ndga-1-26-cr-00256)

A case that is alleged

-   Singapore server-fraud case, 1 Jul 2026: [Further charges.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#sg-spf-2025-02-27-server-fraud)
-   United States v. Ho, Raymond, Li and Chen, 19 Aug 2026: [Trial date set.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-mdfl-8-25-cr-00530)
-   United States v. Yuan and Gong, 22 Jul 2026: [Appeal.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-sdtx-4-25-cr-00687)
-   Keelung District Prosecutors Office indictment, 10 Sep 2026: [Bail upheld on appeal.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#tw-klc-2026-08-24-b300-servers)
-   United States v. Lui, 5 Oct 2026: [Arraignment.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#us-cdca-2-26-cr-00618)

An official body’s document

-   Singapore Police Force, 27 Feb 2025: [Singapore Customs was also investigating whether offences under the Customs Act 1960 and the Regulation of Imports and Exports Act 1995 had been committed, in the server-fraud matter that is a case in this list.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-sg-customs-server-investigation-2025-02)
-   Korea Customs Service, 6 Jul 2026: [In March 2026 it had detected a company that brought in US-made AI servers carrying high-performance GPUs, controlled as strategic items, and exported 816 of them, worth KRW 250 billion, without an export permit; the release does not name the company or the countries the servers came from and went to.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-kr-kcs-816-ai-servers-2026-03)

A press report

-   Bernama, in Malay Mail, 26 Mar 2025: [Malaysia’s trade minister said the Nvidia AI-chip fraud case allegedly linked to Malaysia “is still under investigation” by his ministry with the police, customs and the communications regulator; Singapore media had reported that the chips were in servers supplied by Dell and Supermicro to a Singapore company before being moved to Malaysia.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-singapore-servers-inquiry-2025-03)
-   Reuters, in Korea JoongAng Daily, 9 Apr 2025: [TSMC could face a penalty of $1 billion or more “to settle a U.S. export control investigation” over a chip it made for Sophgo that matched one found in Huawei’s Ascend 910B AI processor, according to two people familiar with the matter.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-us-press-joongang-2025-04-09)
-   The Star (Malaysia), 26 Jun 2026: [Malaysian customs seized 72 servers containing advanced AI chips, worth nearly RM53 million, on 5 June 2026 at the KLIA Free Commercial Zone, where they had been transited without permits, declared as computer components and were to be re-exported to another Asian country.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-klia-72-ai-servers-2026-06)
-   BERNAMA (Malaysian National News Agency), 28 Oct 2026: [KLIA customs seized 30 servers containing advanced AI chips, worth nearly RM49.5 million, on 15 October 2026, brought in from one Asian country to be re-exported to another, and called it the fifth case this year involving the same syndicate, with seizures across the five above RM100 million.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#ex-my-klia-30-ai-servers-2026-10)

A published allegation

-   Culper Research, 13 May 2026: [In its opinion “over 20% of Nvidia’s FY 2026 compute revenues remained driven by China – supported both by illegal GPU diversion and Southeast Asian intermediaries”, naming Megaspeed and its Malaysian subsidiary Speedmatrix among them.](https://scrutica.com/export-controls/diversion#culper-report)

### Bought abroad by a company headquartered in China

An official body’s document

-   Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, 31 May 2026: [“a license requirement continues to apply under § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A) of the EAR to all destinations outside the United States for these advanced computing items when such items are for entities headquartered in, or whose ultimate parent company is headquartered in, Country Group D:5 or Macau.”](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-us-bis-guidance-2026-05-31-hq-licence)
-   Ministry of Commerce, China, 4 Jun 2026: [“Reportedly, the US Department of Commerce acted on 31 May local time to begin closing a so-called ‘regulatory loophole’ that had existed for a year.”](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-us-bis-guidance-2026-05-31-hq-licence)

A press report

-   Reuters, as The Star carried it, 1 Jun 2026: [The report said the Commerce Department had moved to close a potential loophole that may have led companies to export the most advanced chips, such as Nvidia’s Blackwell processors, to subsidiaries of Chinese companies outside China.](https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2026/06/01/us-takes-step-to-halt-nvidia-ai-chip-shipments-to-chinese-firms-outside-china)

### Rented abroad from another company’s data centre

An official body’s document

-   Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry, Malaysia, 18 Jun 2025: [“In reference to a few media reports on the use of servers equipped with Nvidia chips and AI chips in Large Language Models (LLM) training in Malaysia by a Chinese company, the Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI) is still in the process of verifying the matter with relevant agencies if any domestic law or regulation has been breached.”](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-my-miti-20250618-zero-tolerance-statement)
-   Michael Kratsios, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, 22 Jul 2026: [He wrote that Moonshot AI had acquired GB300-equipped servers, and that it “has accessed GB300s in Thailand, likely to train its AI models”.](https://x.com/mkratsios47/status/2079933645888880708)
-   Ministry of Digital Development and Information, Singapore, 6 Oct 2026: [“We are monitoring developments on export controls on AI chips and restrictions on remote access to computing resources.”](https://scrutica.com/verification/policy#pol-sg-mddi-20261006-ai-chip-export-controls-reply)

A press report

-   [The Wall Street Journal, 13 Jun 2025](https://www.tovima.com/wsj/chinese-ai-companies-dodge-u-s-chip-curbs-by-flying-suitcases-of-hard-drives-abroad/)
-   Tom’s Hardware, relaying The Wall Street Journal, 14 Nov 2025: [The Journal reported that INF Tech, a Shanghai-based AI start-up, had gained access to 2,300 Nvidia Blackwell GPUs operated by Indosat Ooredoo Hutchison in Jakarta.](https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/artificial-intelligence/chinese-ai-startup-gets-access-to-2-300-banned-blackwell-gpus-by-exploiting-cloud-loophole-rents-compute-from-indonesian-firm-with-32-nvidia-gb200-server-racks)
-   HWBusters, relaying Barron’s, 28 Dec 2025: [Barron’s reported that Tencent was using cloud computing infrastructure in Japan and Australia operated by Datasection, a Tokyo-based data-centre company deploying Nvidia’s Blackwell GPUs.](https://hwbusters.com/news/tencent-taps-nvidia-blackwell-through-japan/)
-   Reuters, on a Wall Street Journal report, as The Standard carried it, 13 Mar 2026: [The Journal reported, citing people familiar with the matter, that ByteDance was working with Aolani Cloud, a Southeast Asian firm, to deploy about 36,000 Nvidia B200 chips in Malaysia; Reuters could not immediately verify the report.](https://www.thestandard.com.hk/finance/article/326579/)

A lawful rental does not produce a case.

Method

## Method

Routes. A route is a way a controlled AI chip, or time on one, reaches a company headquartered in China. The page separates four: a sale into China that the rules allow; a movement into China that the rules forbid; a purchase outside China by a company headquartered in China; and the rental of computing time outside China from a data centre another company owns. On the first two the chip crosses China’s border. On the last two it stays abroad, and what crosses is its ownership or its use.

Placement. Each case, document, report and statement is placed on the route its own words describe: where the chip was, and who owned or used it. The reason for each placement is in the page’s data file. A company whose sources do not settle the route is shown between the routes with its latest step.

Scope. The page covers chips the United States controls; chips made in China and chips under the control thresholds are outside it. The counts are of public sources, and say nothing of how many chips moved on a route.