# Compute Leverage: Who Can Stop a Frontier AI Run ## Eight of eleven leverage points can gate a new run at eighteen months; two at five years. 18 months5 yearsCan gate a runUncertainCannot gateEDA tools (chip design) — held by Synopsys, Cadence, Siemens EDA. At 18 months: can gate a run at 18 months. At 5 years: can gate a run at 5 years. Evidence: no source found for the redeployment-time coefficient — drawn dotted, it does not assert alone. Redeployment time: No production leading-edge alternative at any horizon; a full design re-verification on a second toolchain has no qualified ≤7nm target.EDA tools (chip design)EUV lithography — held by ASML. At 18 months: can gate a run at 18 months. At 5 years: can gate a run at 5 years. Evidence: redeployment time from trade press or analyst reporting. Redeployment time: No commercial alternative at any horizon for a Western lab; state-built EUV at scale assessed 5-10+ years outEUV lithographyAdvanced logic foundry (≤5nm/3nm) — held by TSMC, Samsung Foundry, Intel Foundry. At 18 months: can gate a run at 18 months. At 5 years: unresolved at 5 years. Evidence: no source found for the redeployment-time coefficient — drawn dotted, it does not assert alone. Redeployment time: No published figure for a full TSMC→Samsung inter-foundry port of a leading-edge AI acceleratorAdvanced logic foundry (≤5nm/3nm)Advanced packaging / CoWoS — held by TSMC, OSATs (ASE, Amkor, SPIL). At 18 months: can gate a run at 18 months. At 5 years: unresolved at 5 years. Evidence: no source found for the redeployment-time coefficient — drawn dotted, it does not assert alone. Redeployment time: New OSAT production line ~6-9 months; customer-level requalification for a given accelerator unverifiedAdvanced packaging / CoWoSAI accelerator — held by NVIDIA, Google TPU, AWS Trainium, AMD. At 18 months: can gate a run at 18 months. At 5 years: unresolved at 5 years. Evidence: redeployment time from research-grade reporting. Redeployment time: Committed labs (CUDA-bespoke): >18 months. Diversified/vertically-integrated labs: already routed around NVIDIA at production scale (not applicable).AI acceleratorPower / grid interconnection — held by ISO/RTO (MISO, PJM, ERCOT, SPP), local utility, state PUC, FERC, EPA. At 18 months: can gate a run at 18 months. At 5 years: unresolved at 5 years. Evidence: redeployment time from research-grade reporting. Redeployment time: New site: ~4.5yr average to commercial operation (transformer ~160wk OR interconnection study alone exceeds 18 months). A well-capitalized lab can bypass the grid with on-site gas (the xAI Colossus route), so the new-site veto does not bind an incumbent already self-generating its power.Power / grid interconnectionScale-up interconnect (NVLink / NVSwitch) — held by NVIDIA. At 18 months: can gate a run at 18 months. At 5 years: unresolved at 5 years. Evidence: redeployment time from trade press or analyst reporting. Redeployment time: No production UALink alternative until ~late 2026 at earliest (committed labs)Scale-up interconnect (NVLink / NVSwitch)HBM memory (HBM3E / HBM4) — held by SK Hynix, Samsung, Micron. At 18 months: can gate a run at 18 months. At 5 years: cannot gate a run at 5 years. Evidence: redeployment time from trade press or analyst reporting. Redeployment time: 12-24 months to qualify a secondary supplier, anchored to the Samsung→NVIDIA case (~18-month qualification for a supplier with a finished product)HBM memory (HBM3E / HBM4)Capital ($1B+/yr runs) — held by hyperscaler balance sheets, sovereign funds (QIA, PIF, Mubadala), mega-VC. At 18 months: unresolved at 18 months. At 5 years: cannot gate a run at 5 years. Evidence: redeployment time from a primary source. Redeployment time: No frontier-class lab was found single-funder-gated — the largest rounds are syndicates (Anthropic’s $30B Series G: 2 leads, 5 co-leads, ~30 named investors; OpenAI’s $122B round: 6 co-leads plus Amazon/NVIDIA/SoftBank/Microsoft); a single-funder veto is implausible for hyperscalers and multi-investor labs.Capital ($1B+/yr runs)Cloud / datacenter capacity — held by AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, CoreWeave, Oracle, neoclouds. At 18 months: unresolved at 18 months. At 5 years: cannot gate a run at 5 years. Evidence: redeployment time from trade press or analyst reporting. Redeployment time: Binding for single-vendor-locked startups; not for multi-vendor pre-positioned labsCloud / datacenter capacityScale-out interconnect (InfiniBand vs Ethernet) — held by NVIDIA/Mellanox InfiniBand, Broadcom/Arista Ethernet. At 18 months: cannot gate a run at 18 months. At 5 years: cannot gate a run at 5 years. Evidence: redeployment time from trade press or analyst reporting. Redeployment time: Routable to Ethernet now for a lab with fabric-engineering capacityScale-out interconnect (InfiniBand vs Ethernet)primary / researchpress · analystno source foundheld by a stack of institutions, not one firm _The horizon slope._ One line per leverage point of the frontier-AI compute stack, carried from its veto verdict at eighteen months — the window to field a new frontier run — to its verdict at five years, the window for structural independence. A holder gates a run when switching cost × redeployment time exceeds the horizon, not when it merely holds market share. Line weight carries the authority tier of the redeployment-time coefficient, the input the verdict turns on: solid at primary or research grade, lighter at press or analyst grade, dotted where no source was found. A hollow square marks a gate held by a coupled stack of institutions rather than a single firm. The verdicts drawn are the cross-run defaults; a specific lab clears some of them, as the strip below shows. The honest limit: the five-year column is a judgement about how markets mature, not a measurement — five of the eight present gates resolve to _uncertain_ rather than to a verdict. Eleven leverage points stand between a lab and a trained frontier model. At eighteen months eight of them can gate a new run; at five years only two still can — EDA tools (chip design) and EUV lithography, where no commercial alternative exists at any horizon a Western lab could reach. Every one of the eight answers to some public lever, but the lever that reaches seven of them is export control, which governs where a holder may sell — not whether it must sell to anyone in particular. It polices diversion, not allocation. The count is a barrier to entry: it gates who can start a frontier run, not who can halt one already under way. ### The register Cite CSVJSONJSON+Prov PrintScreenshot Every leverage point, with the verdict at both horizons, the strongest governance hook over the layer and the rule that assigns it, and the redeployment time the verdict turns on. Verdicts are cross-run defaults. Leverage point 18 months 5 years Checked by Redeployment time EUV lithography · ASML can gate can gate Export control — A 100% monopoly, but governed by Dutch + US multilateral export-control law — a governance hook exists over the layer, so it is checked-in-principle rather than fully uncontested. No commercial alternative at any horizon for a Western lab; state-built EUV at scale assessed 5-10+ years out · estimated Advanced logic foundry (≤5nm/3nm) · TSMC, Samsung Foundry, Intel Foundry can gate uncertain Export control — Leading-edge logic fabrication is governed by US export-control law: the Foreign Direct Product Rule reaches any chip made with US tooling, and the Jan-2025 Foundry Due-Diligence Rule mandates quarterly OSAT/foundry KYC compliance reporting to BIS — a public lever exists over the layer. No published figure for a full TSMC→Samsung inter-foundry port of a leading-edge AI accelerator · no source found EDA tools (chip design) · Synopsys, Cadence, Siemens EDA can gate can gate Export control — EDA for leading-edge design is governed by US export-control law: BIS exercised a standing enforcement order (Cadence $95M penalty, 28 Jul 2025, for EDA exports to Entity-List parties NUDT/Phytium under EAR §744) — a public lever exists over the layer. The broader China-sales licensing letters to Synopsys/Cadence/Siemens (imposed 23 May 2025) were rescinded 2 Jul 2025 under the US–China framework, so the enforcement order, not the letters, is the live instrument. No production leading-edge alternative at any horizon; a full design re-verification on a second toolchain has no qualified ≤7nm target. · no source found HBM memory (HBM3E / HBM4) · SK Hynix, Samsung, Micron can gate cannot gate Export control — HBM is governed by US export-control law — the Dec-2024 rule controls HBM at/above a bandwidth-density threshold (>2 GB/s/mm²), on top of the Oct-2022/Oct-2023 advanced-computing controls — a public lever exists over the layer. 12-24 months to qualify a secondary supplier, anchored to the Samsung→NVIDIA case (~18-month qualification for a supplier with a finished product) · estimated Advanced packaging / CoWoS · TSMC, OSATs (ASE, Amkor, SPIL) can gate uncertain Export control — Since 16 Jan 2025, with compliance required from 31 Jan, a BIS regime reaches the packaging layer directly: the Foundry Due-Diligence Rule (90 FR 5298, FR Doc. 2025-00711) makes approved-OSAT attestations the mechanism by which packaged advanced ICs escape licensing presumptions, keeps the approved-OSAT list at Supplement No. 7 to Part 740, and requires quarterly OSAT/foundry compliance reporting — the same rule already cited on the advanced-foundry layer, whose named obligors include this layer’s own holders. The Dec-2024 rule separately controls advanced-packaging equipment. New OSAT production line ~6-9 months; customer-level requalification for a given accelerator unverified · no source found AI accelerator · NVIDIA, Google TPU, AWS Trainium, AMD can gate uncertain Export control — Frontier AI accelerators are the primary object of US export-control law (ECCN 3A090/4A090; the Oct-2023 Total-Processing-Performance metric closed the A800/H800 work-arounds) — the most-governed layer in the stack. Committed labs (CUDA-bespoke): >18 months. Diversified/vertically-integrated labs: already routed around NVIDIA at production scale (not applicable). · estimated Scale-up interconnect (NVLink / NVSwitch) · NVIDIA can gate uncertain Export control — Reached by the same US advanced-computing export-control architecture as the accelerator it binds: ECCN 3A090 has an I/O-bandwidth control parameter (≥150 GB/s aggregate bidirectional) and 4A090 covers electronic assemblies/components incorporating controlled accelerators (e.g. GB200 NVL72 racks) — the scale-up fabric is governed by the regime, not merely by an emerging market alternative. No production UALink alternative until ~late 2026 at earliest (committed labs) · estimated Scale-out interconnect (InfiniBand vs Ethernet) · NVIDIA/Mellanox InfiniBand, Broadcom/Arista Ethernet cannot gate cannot gate Competition — Ethernet (Broadcom, Arista, Ultra Ethernet Consortium) is a production-scale alternative; demonstrated at frontier scale. Routable to Ethernet now for a lab with fabric-engineering capacity · estimated Cloud / datacenter capacity · AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, CoreWeave, Oracle, neoclouds uncertain cannot gate Competition — Capacity is fragmenting (97GW of new colocation projected 2025-30); multi-vendor structure means no single cloud provider is a unilateral veto for a top lab. Binding for single-vendor-locked startups; not for multi-vendor pre-positioned labs · estimated Power / grid interconnection · ISO/RTO (MISO, PJM, ERCOT, SPP), local utility, state PUC, FERC, EPA — a coupled stack of institutions, not one firm can gate uncertain Public body — The veto-holders are public bodies (ISO/RTO, utilities, state PUCs, FERC, EPA) subject to democratic/regulatory/FOIA accountability — a DIFFERENT KIND of power than a private monopoly. New site: ~4.5yr average to commercial operation (transformer ~160wk OR interconnection study alone exceeds 18 months). A well-capitalized lab can bypass the grid with on-site gas (the xAI Colossus route), so the new-site veto does not bind an incumbent already self-generating its power. · estimated Capital ($1B+/yr runs) · hyperscaler balance sheets, sovereign funds (QIA, PIF, Mubadala), mega-VC uncertain cannot gate Competition — Capital access is structurally expanding (sovereigns + infrastructure investors entering); diversified + compute-entangled funding means no single provider is a unilateral veto for a top lab. No frontier-class lab was found single-funder-gated — the largest rounds are syndicates (Anthropic’s $30B Series G: 2 leads, 5 co-leads, ~30 named investors; OpenAI’s $122B round: 6 co-leads plus Amazon/NVIDIA/SoftBank/Microsoft); a single-funder veto is implausible for hyperscalers and multi-investor labs. · estimated Needs verificationThree redeployment-time coefficients — EDA tools (chip design), advanced logic foundry (≤5nm/3nm), advanced packaging / CoWoS — have no published figure behind them. Each is drawn dotted in the plate above and none of the three carries a verdict on its own: the eighteen-month gate at each rests on capacity or on the absence of a qualified alternative, both of which are sourced. ### The same stack, three labs A gate binds a lab that cannot route around it, so the count is a property of the run as much as of the stack. Against the cross-run baseline of eight gates, a lab that designs its own accelerator and runs it on its own fabric clears the ones a CUDA-committed lab cannot. 7 **xAI** — 7 of 11 leverage points gate this run at eighteen months, 2 at five years. NVIDIA H100 / H200 / GB200 NVL72, on Spectrum-X Ethernet scale-out [Resolve the page against this run](/compute-leverage?run=xai-colossus) 5 **Google** — 5 of 11 leverage points gate this run at eighteen months, 2 at five years. Google TPU v5e / v5p / v6e (Trillium); proprietary ICI interconnect; zero NVIDIA in the training path [Resolve the page against this run](/compute-leverage?run=google-gemini) 5 **Anthropic** — 5 of 11 leverage points gate this run at eighteen months, 2 at five years. AWS Trainium2 (>1M chips in production) anchors a deliberately diversified accelerator fleet — Anthropic spreads Claude across "a range of chips" (its words), publicly including AWS Trainium, Google TPUs, and NVIDIA GPUs. [Resolve the page against this run](/compute-leverage?run=anthropic) ### How a verdict is mademethod 2026-07-22 #### 1 · Leverage, not share A holder gates a run when switching cost × redeployment time exceeds the horizon — when the lab cannot route around it in time. Market share is shown as context and never decides a verdict: the scale-out interconnect layer is concentrated and gates nothing, because Ethernet is a real substitute a lab can adopt now, while advanced packaging has no published share split and gates at eighteen months because capacity is allocated years out. Two horizons, because they answer different questions. Eighteen months is the window to field a new run; five years is the window for structural independence. A closing window reads _can gate_ then _cannot_; a permanent lock reads _can gate_ at both. [How leverage is derived↗](/methodology#cascade-simulation "How this is derived: cascade propagation weights. Weighted BFS over directed supply-chain edges; severity decays each hop by input substitutability.") #### 2 · The check, and its direction Accountability is the strongest governance hook over the layer under a fixed priority order — export control, then antitrust, then a public body, then competition, then nothing — assigned per layer against a stated rule the reader can contest. Whether a competitor is reachable inside a horizon lives in the verdict, not the tag: an alternative that exists but cannot be switched to in eighteen months is a gate with a competition hook, not an absence of accountability. 7 of 11 layers are checked by export control, and that hook is directional. These regimes govern whom a holder may sell to — they police diversion. None of them obliges a holder to sell to any particular lab, so the lever that reaches furthest across this stack is not a lever on allocation. [What each check can and cannot reach, layer by layer](/compute-leverage/brief).